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in implementing the suggestions would appear to be minimal, and their

.effect should be to decrease the number of colorable post-sentence claims.
However, since conformity with the procedures remains at least theoretically
,optional, it would appear that as long as a district court complies with the
minimum requirements of rule 11 the Third Circuit would not hold a
-failure to follow the suggestions to be grounds for reversal or for the
43
,withdrawal of a plea.
R.G.E.
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.Duquesne Light Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency (3d Cir. 1973)
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (Clean Air Act) 1 provide
for federal-state interaction in order to achieve higher standards of air
quality. Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act provide for federal
-designation of air pollutants and for promulgation of federal standards
with regard to pollutants so designated. 2 Section ll0(a) (1), which defines the responsibility of the states within this bi-level scheme, requires
that within 9 months of the promulgation of these federal standards, each
state is to adopt and submit to the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), a state implementation plan for achieving the
federal standards within the state.8 Upon approval of the state plan by the
Administrator, it is enforceable by federal as well as state authorities. 4
Pursuant to this scheme, the Pennsylvania Environmental Quality
Board held hearings 5 and, in January 1972, adopted regulations limiting
43. See notes 25-30 & 33 and accompanying text supra.

1.42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970).

2. Id. §§ 1857c-3 to c-4.
3. Id. § 1857c-5(a) (1).
4. Clean Air Act § 113, U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970). After permitting a period of
30 days to pass after notifying the offender of a violation, the Administrator may
impose civil and criminal sanctions upon the violator. Under this section, fines not
,greater than $25,000 a day and/or imprisonment of not more than 1 year are authorized
for first violations. Id. § 1857c-8(c) (1) (1970).
5. Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir. 1973). Representatives
-of by
petitioners
appeared at
theseWidger
hearings
andof presented
the form of oral
Published
Villanova University
Charles
School
Law Digital evidence
Repository,in1973
.testimony and written statements. Id.
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the emission of polluting sulfur oxides into the air.6 Without further
proceedings, the Administrator of the EPA, in accordance with section
110(a) (2) of the Clean Air Act, 7 approved part of the Pennsylvania plan.a
Petitioners,9 invoking section 307(b) (1) of the Clean Air Act,'0
sought reconsideration of .the approved portion of the plan by the Administrator, contending inter alia that requirements of due process demanded
that they be afforded some form of hearing prior to federal adoption or
enforcement of the state implementation plan." The Third Circuit accepted this contention and ordered reconsideration of the case by the EPA
without specifying the type of procedure to be followed. 12 On consideration of the EPA's motion opposing that order,'13 the court determined
that section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 14 was inapplicable and that an adjudicative hearing was not constitutionally
required. 15 Nevertheless, the court stated that since the petitioners had
complied with the provisions of the Clean Air Act allowing for judicial
review' and had initiated state administrative proceedings, 17 it was
fundamentally unfair to subject them to the risk of punishment without
allowing full opportunity for the expression of objections to the state
6. Id. at 4-5. The regulations in question were part of the Pennsylvania state
implementation plan'enacted pursuant to section 110(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970). This section provides that:
The Administrator shall, within four months after the date required for submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or disapprove such plan or each
portion thereof. The Administrator shall approve such plan, or any portion.
Id.

thereof, if he determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing.

8. 37 Fed. Reg. 10842, 10889-91 (1972).
9. Petitioners were Duquesne Light Co., Pennsylvania Power Co., Ohio Edison
Co., and St. Joe Minerals Corp., 481 F.2d at 2.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (1970). This section provides that within 30
days of the date of the Administrator's approval, petitions for review may be filed in.
the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the state is located.
Section 307(b) (2) prohibits litigation in enforcement proceedings of issues subject
to review under section 307(b) (1). 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (2) (1970).
11. 481 F.2d at 5, 7-8. Petitioners requested that reconsideration be conducted
as either a rulemaking hearing, pursuant to section 4 of the Administrative Procedurez
Act (APA) or as an adjudicative-type hearing, pursuant to section 5 of the APA.
5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (1970). Rulemaking is that part of the administrative process
which resembles a legislature's enactment of a statute. It affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal
position of any individual will be affected by it. Adjudication is that part of the.
administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a case. It operates con-

cretely upon individuals in their individual capacities. 1 K.
LAw TREATISE § 5.01 (1958).

DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE.

12. 481 F.2d at 3. Remand was granted on January 22, 1973, without opinion.
13. Respondent EPA's motion was designated a "Motion for Clarification, or in,
the Alternative Petition for Rehearing." Id. The EPA contended that redress through
the state administrative process was the proper course for petitioners to follow. Id. at 7.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
15. 481 F.2d at 7.
16. Petitioners filed petitions within the 30 days required by section 307(b) (1).
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (1970). The Third Circuit, in a previous decision, had',
held that unless this requirement is met, review by the court of appeals is foreclosed.
Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
1125 (1973).
17. 481 F.2d at 7.
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implementation plan. s Accordingly, the court clarified its earlier decision,
holding that the EPA must either refrain from imposing sanctions on
petitioners during pendency of their state administrative and judicial
actions, so long as such actions were pursued in good faith and with due
diligence, or afford petitioners a limited legislative hearing. Duquesne
Light Co. v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973).
The decision of the court in Duquesne embraces three significant
elements: 1) the refusal to apply the requirements of the APA to the
EPA's action in adopting the state plan ;19 2) the decision that a limited
legislative hearing was constitutionally required if federal enforcement
were to precede completion of state administrative and judicial proceedings;20 and 3) the attempt to shape relief in order to avoid what the
'21
court termed the "Getty Oil dilemma.
1.

Refusal to Apply the Requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act

22
Manifest congressional desire for expedience in cleaning the air,
coupled with an attempt to maintain local control over enforcement and
implementation procedures 23 resulted in the bi-level program under the
Clean Air Act, whereby certain aspects of pollution control are deemed
to be within the exclusive province of the EPA while other aspects are
24
delegated to the states.
In Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,25
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit emphasized

18. Id. at 10. Since section 113 of the Clean Air Act makes the state regulations

federally enforceable, petitioners were subject to federal sanctions while awaiting

resolution of their request for variances through the state administrative process.
Id. at 8.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 10. The court provided for both submission of written comments and
presentation of oral statements in its definition of the limited legislative hearing posed
as an alternative on remand. Id.
21. Id. at 7-8. See notes 45-51 and accompanying text infra.
22. S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970) ; H.R. REP. No. 91-1146,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970). This need for alacrity has caused some courts to
inject an element of flexibility in determining what procedures are required of the
EPA. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ;
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also notes
25-29 and accompanying text infra. This type of judicial treatment is arguably more
responsive to the needs raised by particular issues than adherence to strict categorization. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 11, § 5.01; Clagett, Informal Action - Adjudication - Rule-Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law,
1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look
at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA.
L. REV. 485 (1970).

23. The Clean Air Act provides in part that "the prevention and control of air
pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments ....

."

42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3)

(1970).

24. Requirements under section 110(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act for state enactment of plans to achieve federally-established standards serve the purpose of preserving
basic state and local1 control of air pollution regulations, while provision for federal
approval, in section l0(a) (2), and federal enforcement, in section 113, of state plans
is an attempt to achieve more effective and expeditious results. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857cPublished 5(a)
by Villanova
University
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
(1)-(2),
c-8 (1970).
25. 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
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those legislatively-imposed time restraints in determining that evidentiary
before approval
hearings were not statutorily required at the federal level
26 In reaching this
of state plans under section 110 of the Clean Air Act.
of the Adminconclusion, the Fourth Circuit avoided classifying the action
requirements of
28
istrator solely as traditional rulemaking subject to APAwas
"informal"
action
27
Thus, the decision that the EPA
29
a "hearing.
legislative intent in this area.
was that court's method of accommodating
the
In refusing to require application of section 4 of the APA,
conclusion
and
reasoning
Circuit's
Fourth
Duquesne court endorsed the
level would
that Congress had made a finding that a hearing at the federal
requirements
the
meeting
thus
be both "impractical" and "unnecessary,"
requirement.80
for exemption of the proceeding from the APA "hearing"
to the
The Duquesne court's refusal to require the EPA to adhere
concern
legislative
and
APA can be justified on the basis of precedent
notice and
with rapidity of action. However, APA procedures for
solution
desired
the
that
opportunity to participate are not so cumbersome
they
were
set-back
to the air pollution problem would suffer a serious
3 1 This consideration, coupled with the fact that the court's
to be utilized.
Act calls for approval by the
26. Id. at 499-500. Section 110 of the Clean Airdetermines
that it was adopted
Administrator of a state implementation plan "if he
1857c-5(a) (2) (1970). See note 7

after reasonable notice and hearing." 42 U.S.C. §
of any prior "hearing"
and accompanying text supra. The court considered omission
of congressional desire for
view
in
purposeful,
as
level
federal
the
at
requirement
would be repetitious and
expedition. Since "hearings" at both state and federal levelshad made a finding that a
Congress
that
concluded
court
the
time-consuming,
unduly
477 F.2d at 503.
second "hearing" would be both "impractical" and "unnecessary." from the requireproceeding
rulemaking
a
of
exemption
allows
APA
Section 4 of the
a finding is made. 5 U.S.C.
ments of notice and opportunity to participate when such
§ 553(b) (B) (1970).
in this context, as re27. 477 F.2d at 500. "Hearing" is used in a broad sense
and an opportunity
parties
interested
to
notice
adequate
of
ferring to the requirements
§ 553(c) (1970). See
to participate set forth in section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
before the Adminisnote 31 infra. The court stated that providing a second hearing
be deemed 'rulemaking'
trator was unnecessary "whether the Administrator's action finding that a federal
or otherwise." Id. at 502. In reference to the congressional
court further stated that:
hearing was both "impractical" and "unnecessary," the
exempting certain
[it] met the requirements of Section 553(b) (3) (B), U.S.C.A.,
if, as the petitioners
rulemaking proceedings from any requirements of a hearing
argue, that Act is applicable to the Administrator's action.
determination that the proId. at 503. Thus, the court apparently avoided an actual
rulemaking.
not
was
ceeding
be taken without
28. Informal action refers to administrative action which may
participation provision of
public
the
to
subject
not
is
which
and
hearing
a formal
section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
Agency, 481 F.2d
29. But see Buckeye Power, Inc. v. Environmental Protection the Sixth Circuit
Duquesne,
after
shortly
decided
Buckeye,
In
1973).
162 (6th Cir.
to the EPA's decision
held section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970), applicable
plans.
implementation
state
Kentucky
and
to approve the Ohio
30. 481 F.2d at 8, citing 477 F.2d 495, 499-500 (4th Cir. 1973).
31. Section 4 of the APA provides in part:
interested persons
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
submission of written
an opportunity to participate in the ruling making through
presentation.
data, views or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
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ultimate decision involving a limited hearing will itself entail some delay,
leaves the decision on this issue subject to criticism.
2.

2

The Decision to Grant a Legislative Hearing

For purposes of analysis in a situation in which a hearing is requested,
such as that in Duquesne, the facts before the decisionmaker may be characterized as either "adjudicative" or "legislative.13 3 "Adjudicative" facts
are those which pertain specifically to the parties involved and their
activities, and are of such a nature that they are within the parties' peculiar
knowledge.3 4 "Legislative" facts, on the other hand, are those of general
knowledge and which aid a tribunal in deciding questions of law, policy,
and discretion.3 5 Because "adjudicative" facts are best presented by the
parties themselves, they intrinsically require that the form of the proceeding be that of trial,3 6 whereas "legislative" facts are best presented
either by oral testimony or by written submission of evidence.3 7 The
major distinction between the two categories, however, lies not in the
form which actual presentation of evidence should take, but rather in
the more basic premise that due process requires a hearing only when
"adjudicative" facts are involved.38
Under this analysis, the Third Circuit reached a proper theoretical
conclusion in determining that petitioners had no constitutional right to
32. It is interesting to note that the limited legislative hearing posed by the court
as an alternative on remand would provide the petitioners with what is, in effect, the

equivalent of APA, section 4 participation. Compare note 20 supra with note 31 supra.
33. This model of analysis has been suggested by Professor Davis, 1 K. DAvIs,
supra note 11, § 7.02. Another mode of analysis for distinguishing between the type
of hearing required classifies proceedings as either rulemaking or adjudication. See
note 11 supra.
34. 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 11,

§ 7.02.
35. Id.
36. A proceeding of this type normally includes opportunity for cross-examination
and confrontation of witnesses. Id. § 5.01.
37. Id. § 7.02.
38. Id. § 7.07. The classic examples of the differences between the demands of
due process in situations involving the two different categories of fact are found in
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), and
in Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). In Londoner, the Court he!d that a
landowner who objected to an assessment against his land as its share of the benefit
resulting from the paving of a street had a due process right to a hearing with notice.
Local procedure had granted the right to file a written complaint, but not to be heard
orally. The Court stated that even though the written objection afforded a hearing,
"a hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the
right to support his allegations by argument, however brief, and, if need be, by proof,
however informal." Id. at 385-86. However, in Bi-Metallic Investment Co., the Court
held that no hearing at all was constitutionally required prior to a decision by state
tax officers to increase substantially the valuation of the taxable property in Denver.
The decision distinguished.Londoner on the basis that there a small number of persons
were "exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds." 239 U.S. at 445-46.
Thus, in Londoner, a situation involving "adjudicative" facts, the Court held that due
process demanded at least a hearing including oral argument, whereas in Bi-Metallic
Investment Co., the Court held that due process required no form of hearing whatsoever, noting that "[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption." Id. at 445.
For a more recent pronouncement to the same effect in a situation involving "legislative" facts, see Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960),
Published286
by Villanova
Widger School
of Law
F.2d 319 University
(2d Cir.),Charles
cert. denied,
366 U.S.
962Digital
(1961).Repository, 1973
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an adjudicative hearing since the facts involved in Duquesne were "legislative." 39 Moreover, under the precedent relied on by the court, there is
no statutory right to an adjudicative hearing unless the statute in question provides for "a hearing on the record," 40 which is not the case with
section 110 of the Clean Air Act. 41 In addition, there is no constitutional
right to an adjudicative hearing where, as here, agency action is general
42
in nature and prospective in application.
In sharp contrast to this well-supported decision regarding the right
to an adjudicative hearing, the court took the unusual position that there
existed, on these facts, a constitutional right to a limited legislative hearing
on solely "legislative" facts. Because this decision rests on no cited precedent, the explanation for the court's holding must be found elsewhere.
Perhaps the only justification for the court's decision is the desirability of avoiding recurrence of the "Getty Oil dilemma. ' 43 Stated
simply, the "dilemma" is that, despite the absence of a federal hearing,
petitioners could be subject to federal sanctions for violation of regulations developed solely by the state and eventually rendered unenforceable
at the state level.44 Under the holding in Duquesne, the state plan must
either be vindicated at the state level or a hearing must be held at the
federal level before approval or enforcement can occur. Thus the court
has avoided what could be an unseemly, if not constitutionally unfair,
sequence of events.
Although the court has clearly stepped beyond precedent in holding
a limited legislative hearing to be constitutionally required, it is difficult
to call the decision a misstep because of the presence of the "Getty Oil
dilemma." If the requirement of a legislative hearing on legislative facts
is limited to situations involving the type of federal-state interaction
present in Duquesne, the result seems justifiable. However, a blind extension of this holding in other factual settings could result in a serious
interference with the administrative decisionmaking process due to the
increased administrative burden that it would entail.
3.

Resolution of the "Getty Oil Dilemma"

Having decided that due process demanded that relief in some form
be granted, the court was faced with resolving what it termed the "Getty
39. The Pennsylvania state regulations represent essentially a general policy

decision and therefore are based on "legislative" facts.
40. 481 F.2d at 7, citing United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224
(1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Co., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).

41. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970). See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
42. 481 F.2d at 7, citing United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224
(1973); Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority,
476 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1973). These cases did not employ the "legislative" - "adjudicative" facts analysis but rather made a distinction between rulemaking and adjudication. The procedure is rulemaking if the regulations are prospective and general
in application, whereas it is adjudication if the challenged provisions are retrospective
and individual in impact. See note 11, supra.
43. See notes 45-51 and accompanying text infra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
44. See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text infra.
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Oil dilemma." In Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 45 the Delaware state
implementation plan had received federal approval and a variance from
46
the state plan was sought through the state administrative process.
Variance was denied and Getty sought and was granted relief from the
denial in Delaware state court. 47 Consequently, Getty found itself subject
to federal sanctions for violation of state regulations adopted by the
federal government, but, in effect, repudiated by the state. 48
Similarly, in the present case, state action on the petitioners' applications for variances was pending, while at the same time federal enforcement of the state plan was possible under section 113 .4 9 Because the
final state administrative determination is subject to judicial review,50
the Duquesne court was confronted with the problem of shaping relief
in order to avoid recurrence of the "Getty Oil dilemma." The court
stated that:
The basic problem presented by the Getty Oil dilemma and the
legislative hearing request is that the petitioning companies are liable
to sanctions before they have had an opportunity either to complete
their state administrative and judicial remedies or to be heard at
the federal level. 51
Viewing the dilemma, then, as the possibility of federal sanction
without adequate opportunity to be heard at either the state or federal
level, the court found a novel method of extricating the petitioners. In
effect, it left the decision as to the real import of the congressional desire
for expediency up to the EPA. If the agency determines that the quickest
possible resolution would best serve the purposes of the Clean Air Act,
52
it will proceed with the limited legislative hearing outlined by the court.
If, on the other hand, the agency finds that the situation before it does
not present an issue of great urgency, it can then await completion of
the more time-consuming state administrative and judicial procedures.
It is submitted that there is one other factor which may influence
the Administrator's decision on which course to follow. If the decision
is to await state procedures, there is then the risk that the state adjudication will nullify the plan, in which case there would be no plan which
could be adopted or enforced at the federal level. If a federal hearing
is held, however, the plan, if acceptable, could be adopted and enforced
45. 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
46. Id. at 353.
47. Id. at 354. The state court granted a temporary restraining order against
enforcement of the objectionable provisions. Id.
48. The Third Circuit denied Getty's request for an injunction against federal
enforcement on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction since Getty had
failed to seek federal judicial review under section 307(b) (1) of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970). Id. at 357.
49. 481 F.2d at 7.
50. Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law § 41, PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1710.41 (1962).

51. 481 F.2d at 10.

52. Id. University
See note 20
supra.
Published by Villanova
Charles
Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973

tit. 71,
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by the EPA regardless of the results of state litigation. Thus, the decision
to await completion of state procedures involves an element of risk to
the plan itself which is beyond the control of the EPA.
The opinion as a whole demonstrates a willingness to apply novel
solutions to the difficult problems inherent in any attempt to balance the
individual's right to fair procedures against society's desire for a cleaner
environment - a task the difficulty of which is only increased by the
bi-level nature of the Clean Air Act. Because of the novelty of its solution, the court has exposed itself to criticism. 53 However, it merits
commendation for confronting the issues in a responsive manner.
K.A.B.

LABOR LAW

-

ARBITRATION -

THIRD CIRCUIT DECISION THAT SAFETY

DISPUTES ARE NOT PRESUMED ARBITRABLE DESPITE GENERAL FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES REVERSED.

Gateway Coal Co. v. Local 6330, UMW (3d Cir. 1972)
(rev'd, U.S. 1974)
Gateway Coal Company (Company) and Local 6330 of the United
Mine Workers (Union) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
which contained a broad binding arbitration clause.' A dispute arose as
a result of the failure of three assistant foremen to carry out certain prescribed safety procedures. 2 After an inspection disclosed that there had
been a falsification of mine records with regard to that incident, the Union
membership voted not to work under the foremen involved and the foremen
were subsequently suspended.3 When the Company reinstated two of the
foremen, the miners walked off the job. 4 The Company offered to submit
the dispute to arbitration but the Union refused, contending that the dispute
was not arbitrable under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. "5
The Company, invoking federal jurisdiction under section 301 of the Taft53. Indeed the court acknowledged the possibility of such criticism:

We are operating on the frontiers of legal thought, and any advance post that we
take up is liable to the dangers of heavy ground assault. But it is only by such
expeditions that knowledge of the terrain ahead may be gained.
481 F.2d at 10 n.49.

1. A section of the agreement entitled "Settlement of Local and District
Disputes" provided that "should any local trouble of any kind arise at the mine"
the parties were to attempt to settle it through local negotiation. If these procedures
failed, the final step was to refer the dispute to an impartial umpire for decision with
the provision that the "decision of the umpire shall be final." Gateway Coal Co. v.
Local 6330, UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
The agreement did not contain an express no-strike clause. See id.
2. Id. at 1158.
3. Id.
4. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
5. Id.
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Hartley Act,0 sought a Boys Markets injunction 7 to stop the walkout on.
the theory that the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration clauseand was, therefore, subject to federal injunctive relief."
The district court issued a preliminary injunction directing that: (1)
the dispute be submitted to an impartial umpire for binding decision; (2)
the three foremen involved be suspended pending such decision; and (3)
the miners not strike to enforce their demands for the removal of these
men. 9 While the Union's appeal was pending, arbitration proceedings were
held which resulted in a decision that the dispute was arbitrable, that theminers' contention that it was unsafe to work under the foremen was withoutmerit, and that the foremen should be allowed to return to work. 10
The Third Circuit reversed the order of the district court and vacated
the preliminary injunction, holding that, at least in the absence of a contract
clause specifically making safety disputes arbitrable, the Union could not be
compelled to submit the dispute to arbitration in the absence of proof'
that the miners did not have a good faith belief that their lives were unduly
endangered while the particular foremen involved were responsible for
safety procedures. Gateway Coal Cd.v.Local 6330, UMW,466 F.2d 1157
(3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
The strong federal policy favoring arbitration as a means of settling
labor disputes was clearly expressed by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy." The development of this federal pro-arbitration attitude
culminated in the decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Local 770. Retail
Clerks12 wherein the Court indicated that a binding arbitration clause,
with its attendant no-strike obligations, was enforceable in some instances.
by a federal anti-strike injunction regardless of the prohibition against
1
such a procedure contained in section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. "
6. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
7. 466 F.2d at 1160 n.1. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Local 770, Retail Clerks,.
398 U.S. 235 (1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REv. 176 (1970).
8. 466 F.2d at 1159.
9. Gateway Coal Co. v. Local 6330, UMW, 80 L.R.R.M. 2634, 69 CCH Lab.
Cas. ff 12,944 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
10. 466 F.2d at 1158.
11. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United'
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In these cases the Supreme
Court applied a presumption of arbitrability. For a detailed history of the federal
policy favoring arbitration, and an explanation of the presumption of arbitrability
created thereby, see Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption
of Arbitrability, 85 HARV. L. REV. 636 (1972).
12. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
Prior to Boys Markets, itwas held that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), barred a federal court from enjoining a strike inbreach

of a collective bargaining agreement, notwithstanding the fact that such agreement
contained binding arbitration provisions enforceable under section 301 of the TaftHartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Sinclair Refining Co. v.Atkinson, 370 U.S.

195 (1962).

The Third Circuit previously had interpreted Boys Markets as being applicable only to those situations where the collective bargaining agreement contained
an express no-strike clause. Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir.
Published by
Villanova
University
Charles
School
of Law Digital Repository, 1973
1972),
noted
in 18 VILL.
L.Widger
REv. 320
(1972).
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Prior to Gateway, the Third Circuit recognized this policy and applied
:a presumption of arbitrability to labor disputes where economic issues were
-involved.'4 However, in instances where employee safety was at issue, a
good faith belief in the existence of abnormally dangerous conditions at the
-place of work had been held sufficient to protect a work stoppage, under
15
-section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
In Gateway, the collective bargaining agreement did not particularly
-state that safety disputes were subject to arbitration; nor were they specifi-cally excluded.' 6 There was, however, a separate clause authorizing the
closing of the mine for safety reasons.' 7 The Third Circuit found that
under such circumstances it could not be said that it was "unambiguously
:agreed in the labor contract that the parties [should] submit mine safety
-disputes to binding arbitration.' 8 Had the court chosen to apply the
-usual presumption of arbitrability, the dispute could well have been found
.within the scope of the arbitration clause. 19 The court, however, declined
to apply the general presumption as it had done in earlier cases, and held
matters of life and death to be sui generis,20 stating that the "[c] onsiderations of economic peace that favor arbitration of ordinary disputes have
'little weight here."121 The court further determined that the legislative
policy expressed in section 502 "should influence a court to reject any
avoidable construction of a labor contract as requiring final disposition of
safety disputes by arbitration. '22 The court thus established that, insofar
'as safety disputes were concerned, a presumption of nonarbitrability
should govern. In addition, the court was willing to recognize, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that the employees' alleged good
14. Avco. Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1972); Radio

-Corp. of America v. Association of Professional Eng'r Personnel, 291 F.2d

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961).

105, 110

15. Section 502 provides, in part:

INlor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith.

because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment ... be deemed a strike under this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
See Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833, 841 (1964), wherein a walkout over unsafe conditions at
the place of work was held to be protected action under section 502 of the Taft-

Hartley Act after the procedure employed in the unloading of a ship was found to

be an unreasonably dangerous condition. 330 F.2d at 494; accord, NLRB v. Knight

Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958). A
lockout by the employer in response to this work stoppage was held to be an unfair

labor practice. 330 F.2d at 495.
16. See note 1 supra.
17. 466 F.2d at 1159. This clause provided that a mine must be closed if the
mine safety committee of the local union found it to be "immediately dangerous." Id.
The court regarded the meeting of the parent body of such committee, at which the
vote not to work under the foremen was taken, as substantially equivalent to this
procedure. Id.

18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. UMW, 436 F.2d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 1970).

20. 466 F.2d at 1159.
21. Id. at 1160.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
22. Id.
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faith belief that a work stoppage was required to protect their safety was
sufficient to invoke the protection of section 502.28
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's
decision in Gateway with one Justice dissenting. 24 The Court found three
questions presented by the case: (1) Did the collective bargaining agreement impose a compulsory duty on the parties to submit safety disputes to
impartial arbitration? (2) If so, did that duty give rise to an implied
no-strike obligation which would support issuance of a Boys Markets
injunction? (3) Did the circumstances of the case satisfy the traditional
equitable considerations which control the availability of injunctive relief ?2'
The Court answered all three questions in the affirmative. 20
As to the first question the Court held that the presumption of arbitrability announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy, and previously recognized
and applied by the Third Circuit to economic disputes, applied with equal
force to safety disputes. 27 The Court then found that the dispute in Gateway
fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
28
agreement.
With regard to the second issue the Court recognized the existence of
a contractual obligation not to strike even in the absence of an express
no-strike clause by virtue of the principle expressed in Teamsters Local
0
174 v. Lucas Flour"
which implies a no-strike obligation where there exists
a mandatory arbitration clause covering the dispute in question.30 Such a
no-strike obligation was deemed sufficient to render a strike in violation
thereof subject to federal injunctive relief under Boys Markets.3'
Lastly, the Court found that the traditional prerequisites for the
granting of injunctive relief existed in that the mine operation would be
caused irreparable harm if the strike in violation of the Union's no-strike
obligation was allowed to continue.3 2 The Court further declared that any
safety issue had been eliminated by the suspension of the foremen in ques83
tion pending a final decision by the arbiter.
The Court's decision makes it clear that safety disputes may not
properly be held to be presumptively nonarbitrable, and that the general
presumption of arbitrability of industrial disputes should not be considered
vitiated by the congressional concern with industrial safety expressed in
section 502. That section deals solely with work stoppages, but does not
mention the arbitration agreement situation found in Gateway.3 4 The Third
23. Id.
24. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
25. Id. at 635.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 638.
28. Id.

29. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
30. Id. at 104-06.

31. 94 S. Ct. at 638-41.
32. Id. at 641.

33. Id. University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
Published by Villanova
34. See note 15 supra.
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Circuit considered the policy expressed in that section - protection of
"work stoppages caused by good faith concern for safety" - controlling
in both situations, i.e., when there is a safety work stoppage and also
when a court must determine whether a safety dispute falls within the
scope of a broadly worded arbitration agreement. The court reasoned
that since a duty not to strike and a duty to submit a dispute to binding arbitration "are opposite sides of a single coin," and that since the
duty not to strike in the case of safety disputes is eliminated by section
502. the duty to submit to arbitration should likewise be eliminated.3' The
Supreme Court, however, found no evidence in the legislative history of
section 502 that indicated that the section was intended as a limitation on
arbitration. 36 Noting that the section, on its face, appeared to bear more
on the scope of a no-strike obligation than on the question of arbitrability,
the Court stated:
To the extent that § 502 might be relevant to the issue of arbitrability,
we find that the considerations favoring arbitrability outweigh
the
7
ambiguous import of that section in the present context a
The Court did recognize the importance of the section in the context of
safety disputes,38 yet considered that the Third Circuit had gone too far
in concluding that "an honest belief, no matter how unjustified, in the
existence of 'abnormally dangerous conditions for work' necessarily invokes the protection of § 502. '' 39 The Court agreed with Judge Rosenn's
dissent that to come within the protection of the section, there must
be some objective evidence to support a conclusion that dangerous conditions actually existed. 40 The Third Circuit, by finding that the walkout was nonenjoinable absent proof that the miners did not have an honest
belief that their lives were endangered, had shifted the burden of proof
on that point to the employer. It would appear that the only way an
employer could have defeated the Third Circuit's presumption of nonarbitrability would have been to prove that no such honest belief existed.
In that respect, the Third Circuit's decision represented a significant departure from precedent.

Id.

41

35. 466 F.2d at 1160.
36. 94 S. Ct. at 636 n.8.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 640. The Court stated:
This section provides a limited exception to an express or implied no-strike obligation. . . . [A] work stoppage called solely to protect employees from immediate danger is authorized by § 502 and cannot be the basis for either a damage
award or a Boys Market [sic] injunction.
39. Id. at 640-41.
40. Id. at 641.
41. Prior to Gateway, the circuits had divided on the question of what was
necessary for the employees' action to be protected by section 502. Some held that
evidence establishing the existence of abnormally dangerous conditions at the place
of work had to be presented. NLRB v. Fruin-Colon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th
Cir. 1964); accord, Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964). See Machaby v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
1967). But see Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steel Workers, 464 F.2d 568 (8th Cir.
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The Supreme Court's decision also made it clear that the Third
Circuit's pre-Gateway interpretation of Boys Markets42 as requiring the
presence of an express no-strike clause before injunctive relief could be
granted was erroneous.4"
Absent an explicit expression of [an intention to negate any implied
no-strike obligation], however, the agreement to arbitrate and the duty
44
not to strike should be construed as having coterminous application.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Gateway, a no-strike obligation,
express or implied, is sufficient to render federal injunctive relief available
to an employer under Boys Markets, provided that there is compliance with
the other requirements enumerated therein.
After Gateway, in order for a union to avoid being subject to a Boys
Markets injunction in a strike over any dispute, safety or economic, it
must bargain for an express clause in the collective bargaining agreement
which either places the question in dispute outside the scope of the arbitration clause contained therein, or specifically negates any implied nostrike obligation arising by virtue of the fact that such an arbitration clause
exists. Moreover, in order to be afforded protection from an injunction
or suit for damages resulting from a safety strike under section 502, a
union will have to present ascertainable objective evidence of the existence
of immediately dangerous conditions to support its alleged good faith belief
in those conditions.
G.F.A.
1972). Other circuits, the Third among them, held that a good faith belief in the
existence of dangerous conditions was sufficient to render section 502 applicable,
without requiring actual proof of the existence of such conditions. Philadelphia
Marine Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833,
841 (1964); Marble Products Co. v. Local 155, United Stone Workers, 335 F.2d
468 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958). However, even in those cases there was evidence
presented which showed the existence of dangerous conditions or other unusual circumstances which tended to support the assertion that the workers' actions were taken
in good faith and reasonably founded in fact. In addition, the National Labor Relations Board had interpreted section 502 as requiring a presentation of objective
evidence of dangerous conditions in order for its protection to be extended to striking
workers who sought to invoke it. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, enforced as modified, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
42. See note 13 supra. The contract in Gateway did not contain an express
no-strike clause. Since the Third Circuit chose to decide the issue of whether the
district court's Boys Markets injunction was proper by determining whether the

dispute was arbitrable, rather than on the basis that no express no-strike clause
existed, it would appear that the Third Circuit rejected the view it had previously
taken and adopted an interpretation of the requirements of Boys Markets similar to
the one expressed by the Supreme Court in its opinion. See 94 S. Ct. at 638-39.
43. 94 S. Ct. at 638-39.
44. Id. at 639.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
AWARDING BACK PAY UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF

1964.
Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (3d Cir. 1973)

Plaintiff, an employee of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse), brought suit against her employer alleging that she had been
discriminated against in her employment on the basis of her sex in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
In 1961 the plaintiff held a position from which employees were
normally promoted within one year's time. The employer, however, refused
to promote her, both before and after the effective date of Title VIi, because
the higher position would have required her to work hours in excess of
2
the maximum permitted by the Pennsylvania Women's Labor Law.
When Westinghouse refused to file for an exception from the Pennsylvania prohibition,3 plaintiff filed a charge of discriminatory employment

practices with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
as provided by Title VII.4 The EEOC found reasonable cause to justify
a finding of discriminatory practices, 5 and initiated conciliation proceedings.
1. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1973). Civil
2000e et seq. (1970).
2. 480 F.2d at 242-43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 103(a), 107 (1964), as
amended (Supp. 1973). The statute prohibits a woman employee from working in
excess of 5 continuous hours without a 30 minute meal or rest break, working in
excess of 6 days and 48 hours a week, and working in excess of 10 hours a day.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 103(a) (1964), as amended (Supp. 1973), provides
in pertinent part:
Where the strict application of the schedule of hours, provided for by this
section, imposes an unnecessary hardship and violates the intent and purpose of
this act, the Secretary of Labor and Industry, with the approval of the Industrial
Board, may make, alter, amend, and repeal general rules and regulations prescribing variations from said schedule of hours ....

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§

4. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
Section 706(a) provides for the filing of discrimination charges with the
EEOC and the attempted elimination of the unlawful discrimination by the EEOC.
Id. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
5. Section 706(a) of the Civil Rights Act provides in part:
If the Commission shall determine, after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the discrimination charge is true, the Commission shall

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
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When conciliation failed, plaintiff commenced suit in federal district court. 6
Thereafter, the EEOC for the first time indicated that it would no longer
consider protective statutes, such as the Women's Labor Law, a defense
to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice under Title VII, 7
and, at approximately the same time, the attorney general of Pennsylvania
advised that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act" implicitly had repealed
the Women's Labor Law. 9 As a result, Westinghouse declared that it
considered the protective statute repealed and promoted the plaintiff. 10
The district court found that Title VII had superseded the Pennsylvania Women's Labor Law and that plaintiff had suffered wage loss by
her failure to be promoted." Nevertheless, the court refused to award
back pay or injunctive relief on the basis that Westinghouse had not acted
"intentionally" within the meaning of section 706(g) of Title VII 12 because of the conflicting provisions of state law.1 3 In addition, the court
determined that, even if Westinghouse had acted intentionally within the
meaning of Title VII, an award of back pay and injunctive relief was
discretionary, 14 and was inappropriate under the circumstances of the
case.

15

endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal

methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
The EEOC's finding was justified on the ground that Westinghouse had not
sought an administrative exception from the Women's Labor Law pursuant to regulation G-19 of the Pennsylvania Industrial Board. 480 F.2d at 244, 250.
Later, after plaintiff consented to an exception from the statutory overtime
restriction, the Pennsylvania Secretary of Labor and Industry authorized Westinghouse, by letter, to permit plaintiff to work the extra hours, but specifically indicated
that Westinghouse could not require her to work in excess of the limits of the

Pennsylvania Women's Labor Law. Id. at 244. Westinghouse still refused to pro-

mote plaintiff.
6. Id. at 244-45.
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(1) (1973).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951 et seq. (1964), as amended (Supp. 1973).
9. 480 F.2d at 245.
10. Id.
11. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467, 473 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
12. Section 7 06(g) provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . ...
Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person
or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise
allowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement
of an individual as a member of a union or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay,
if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or
in violation of section 2000e-3 (a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
13. 325 F. Supp. at 473.
14. See note 12 supra.
15. 325 F. Supp. at 474. The district court did, however, grant the plaintiff
Published byreasonable
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Schoolby
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1973 (1970). 325 F.
attorney'sCharles
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The Third Circuit, while disagreeing with the district court's determination that Westinghouse had not intentionally engaged in an unlawful
employment practice in violation of section 70 6(g), affirmed, holding that
the award of appropriate relief under Title VII was left to the discretion
of the district court to be exercised in the light of all the circumstances,
and that since the discrimination was due to the employer's reliance on a
conflicting state protective statute, the district court had not abused its discretion in not awarding back pay and injunctive relief. Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
The EEOC has not maintained a consistent position regarding state
protective statutes as a defense to charges of unlawful employment practices. 16 In December 1965, the EEOC declared that state protective statutes
would be considered as the basis for a bona fide occupational qualification
exception to the requirements of Title VII,1 7 but that those which simply
subjected women to a denial of benefits would not.18 In August 1966, the
EEOC indicated in a policy statement that it would no longer make determinations on the merits in cases involving conflicting state protective legislation, where administrative exceptions were unavailable. However, the
EEOC, reserving the right to appear as amicus curiae, would advise the
charging parties of their right to sue for a judicial determination of the
validity of the state law.' 9 In February 1968, the EEOC returned to its
original policy. 20 Finally, in August 1969, the EEOC declared that state
protective laws, such as the Pennsylvania Women's Labor Law, would not
be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment
practice or as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational
21
qualification exception.
Against this background of a fluctuating EEOC position and the reliance of Westinghouse on the state protective law, the district court determined that Westinghouse had not intentionally engaged in an unlawful
employment practice.2 2 The Third Circuit concluded, however, that the
16. The EEOC position was of great importance because of the deference the
courts give such administrative determinations. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, rehearing denied, 380
U.S. 989 (1965).
17. Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . * *
on the basis of his ... sex ... in those certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
It should be noted that the EEOC expected an employer asserting such an
exception to attempt to obtain an exception from the agency administering the state
protective law. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (c) (3) (1966). Pennsylvania permitted an employer to seek an exception from the state labor laws by application to the Pennsylvania Industrial Board pursuant to regulation G-19, effective April 23, 1966. 480 F.2d
at 244. Cf. note 5 supra.
18. 30 Fed. Reg. 14926-27 (1965).
19. See 480 F.2d at 244.
20. 33 Fed. Reg. 3344 (1968).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1) (1973).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
22. 325 F. Supp. at 473.
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prevailing case law on the question of what constituted an intentional
violation of section 7 06 (g) of the Civil Rights Act was clear, and required
a contrary result.2 3 The cases relied upon by the court held that intentional
unfair employment practices under section 7 06(g) were those which were
engaged in deliberately rather than accidentally.2 4 On that basis, the Kober
court concluded:
[I] t is now the law that discrimination based on reliance on conflicting
state statutes is an intentional unfair employment practice. Intentional
unfair employment practices are those engaged in deliberately and not
accidentally. No wilfullness on the part of the
employer need be shown
25
to establish a violation of section 706(g).
Having found an intentional violation, the court considered the question of whether an award of back pay was mandated by Title VII, or
whether such determination was within the discretion of the district court.
Plaintiff contended that the cases of Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.26 and
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 2 7 required an award of back pay when
there was an "intentional" unlawful employment practice.28 Those cases
held that the purpose of Title VII was to end proscribed discriminatory
practices, and to provide pecuniary relief to those who have been the subjects of such practices.29 The court also considered Moody v. Albermarle
Paper Co.3 0 as possibly supportive of plaintiff's position. In Moody, the
Fourth Circuit held that an award of back pay to members of a class, who
had succeeded in obtaining an injunction against racial discrimination, was
required by Title VII, unless special circumstances rendered such an award
unjust.8 '

The Third Circuit recognized that the cases relied on by the plaintiff
severely restricted the circumstances under which a trial court could deny
23. 480 F.2d at 245-46.
24. See Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.
1972) ; Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1006-07 (1971) ; Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) ; United Papermakers Local 189 v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
See also Manning v. General Motors Corp., 466 F.2d 812, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1973). Contra Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 341 F. Supp. 336,
338 (D. Mass. 1972); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.
Ore. 1969).

25. 480 F.2d at 246.

26. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
27. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
28. 480 F.2d at 246.
29. 444 F.2d at 804; 416 F.2d at 720-21.
30. 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973).
31. Id. at 142. The Moody court appeared to base its conclusion on an equation
of section 706(g) with section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 142. While
section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970), allows the court in its discretion to

grant attorney's fees, the Fourth Circuit in Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88
(4th Cir. 1971), held that plaintiffs who succeeded in obtaining an injunction in a

Title
VII case
shouldCharles
ordinarily
fees,
unless 1973
special circumstances
Published by
Villanova
University
Widgerrecover
School ofattorney's
Law Digital
Repository,
were found.

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 7

DE.CEMBER

1973]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

an award of back pay. 32 However, the court was convinced, by precedent
of other circuits"8 and the permissive language of section 706(g), 34 that
the award of back pay was within the discretion of the district court, "to
be exercised in the light of all the circumstances of each case."'8 5
After concluding that the determination of the appropriate relief was
within the discretion of the trial judge, the Kober court considered the
question of whether there had been an abuse of discretion in the denial of
an award of back pay to plaintiff.8 6 The court first noted that since there
had been no judicial or quasi-judicial rulings on the validity of the Pennsylvania protective statute until 1969,37 Westinghouse had been faced with
a dilemma resulting from the conflict between the state and federal law,
and that Westinghouse had acted to end the discrimination after the determination that the protective provisions of the state law had been implicitly
repealed. 8 Second, reviewing the letters written to Westinghouse by the
Pennsylvania Secretary of Labor and Industry in regard to an exception
from the Women's Labor Law for the plaintiff, the court concluded that
the limited exception available would not have insulated Westinghouse
from the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.8 9 Therefore, since the
Third Circuit found no basis upon which to question the good faith of
Westinghouse, it concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the
40
denial of an award of back pay by the district court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was intended to correct a serious
41
public problem as well as provide a remedy for private grievances.
Presently, however, the vast majority of Title VII violations continue
32. 480 F.2d at 247.

33. The court followed the reasoning of the courts in LeBlanc v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972); Manning v. General Motors Corp.,
466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1973); and Schaeffer v.
Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972). The holdings of those cases, which
placed the allowance of injunctive relief or an award of back pay within the discretion
of the trial court, may be summarized by the statement of the Schaeffer court:
A court may enjoin and may award damages, but should only order affirmative

action, such as back pay, when such relief is "appropriate." In a case of damages . . . a court must balance the various equities between the parties and decide
upon a result which is consistent with the purpose of the . . .Act, and the fundamental concepts of fairness.
Id. at 1006.
34. See note 12 supra. Note the language of the act, that "the court may enjoin
the respondent . . . and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) (emphasis added).
35. 480 F.2d at 248.
36. Id. at 248-50.
37. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra. Plaintiff was promoted to the
first available vacancy after the EEOC and the attorney general of Pennsylvania
made their determinations. 480 F.2d at 245.
38. 480 F.2d at 249.
39. Id. at 249-50. The letters indicated that plaintiff would be permitted to work
the extra hours but that any attempt to require her to work the hours would be cause
for immediate revocation of the authorization. The Kober court determined that
regulation G-19 did not authorize the Secretary to grant an exception that would have
insulated Westinghouse from liability under the facts of the instant case. Id. at 250.
40. Id. at 249-50.
41. See the discussion of Title VII in S. REP. No. 91-1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
3-6 (1970). See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
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uncorrected, 42 mainly because there is insufficient incentive to overcome the
delay and expense of litigation. 43 Since the courts have generally limited
monetary awards to back pay,44 the importance of that award as an encouragement to bring legitimate suits cannot be ignored if Title VII is to
achieve its intended effect. Discretion has always been circumscribed by
the policy underlying its existence, 45 and the legislative intent behind the
Civil Rights Act clearly was to grant all appropriate relief. 46 In light of
the significance of back pay, it would be antithetical for the form of discretion to be allowed to hinder the substance of the policy which the
discretion was meant to effect. On the other hand, however, the type of
situation involved in the instant case is a difficult one for the employer
because the employer must make a determination as to whether to follow
the federal law or the state statute. 47 The Kober court determined that the
latter consideration was controlling where there was no clear indication that
the federal statute had superseded the state statute, finding it inappropriate
and unnecessarily burdensome to demand back pay from an employer in
such a dilemma.
In establishing the limits within which it considered that discretion
could be exercised, the court indicated that it would leave the award to
the discretion of the district court until a judicial determination was made
on the relative validity of the statutes.48 Once a judicial decision had been
reached, the employer would be required to comply with that decision and,
if determination occurred due to noncompliance, a denial of back pay might
well be an abuse of discretion. Whether a quasi-judicial determination
would be sufficient notice to the employer was not clearly determined.
42. Only a small percentage of violations are even brought to the EEOC. Of
those that are brought, private actions account for less than 10 per cent of the cases
in which the EEOC found reasonable cause, but was unable to conciliate successfully.
Hearings on S. 2453 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1969). See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 336 (1970).
See also Note,
Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1109, 1252-56 (1971); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 467 (1965).
43. See Note, supra note 42, at 1252. Four years passed from the time the plaintiff
filed her complaint until the district court rendered its decision in the instant case.
44. Id. at 1259. While attorney's fees are also awarded they are ineffective as an
incentive because, although they make the suit easier for the complainant, they provide
no individual benefit and therefore no real positive incentive to bring suit. M. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

75 (1966).

45. The court in Bowles v. Goebel, 151 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1945), stated: "Discretion in a legal sense necessarily is the responsible exercise of official conscience on
all the facts of a particular situation in the light of the purpose for which the power
exists." Id. at 674. In determining the proper scope of the exercise of the discretion,
the objective sought to be accomplished by the Act must be given great weight.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944).
46. A House report referring to section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act stated
that the "provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible." H.R.
REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. __ (1972).
47. State as well as federal statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality until there has been a judicial determination as to their invalidity. Davies
Warehouse
Co. v. Bowles,
U.S.School
144, 153
(1944).
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48. 480 F.2d at 250.
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Although the court's discussion of the problem could give rise to such a
conclusion, 49 the court declined to find an abuse of discretion when the
district court did not grant back pay for the time between the EEOC
and the attorney general's statements in 1969 and the promotion of plaintiff in April 1970.0 It is submitted, however, that as administrative interpretations are given great deference by the courts,51 it would not be inequitable to find such an administrative determination as sufficient notice
to the employer.
The court ao made clear that the employer did not have to rely on
a limited exception that would have permitted the plaintiff to consent
to work the extra hours, but would have prohibited Westinghouse from
requiring her to work those hours. 52 Hence, Westinghouse did not have
to provide back pay to the plaintiff for the period between the time it was
informed of the limited exception to her promotion because, in the court's
view, to so order under such a set of circumstances would be "unfair" to
Westinghouse. 58 The fact that Westinghouse could not require the plaintiff
to work the hours comes dangerously close to the generally condemned
argument that profit-motivated business reasons give rise to a bona fide
occupational qualification. 54 At least it is a matter of weighing the
dichotomous policy considerations between the possible inconvenience to
Westinghouse in finding another operator to fill in when plaintiff refuses to
work,55 and the public and private reasons for awarding back pay.58
It is hoped that the Kober court's decision will be read as granting
the district courts wide discretion in the determination of whether or not
to award back pay only in those situations in which a conflicting state
statute is involved, rather than as allowing wide discretion in the award
of back pay in any case, a position which might itself be read as signaling an
attitude against the award of back pay as a matter of course. Given the
narrower interpretation, the court's decision may only slightly decrease
the already low incentive for bringing Title VII cases when state protective
legislation is involved, but may not substantially affect suits in other
areas of employment discrimination.
J. T. H.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See note 16 supra.

52. 480 F.2d at 250. See notes 5 &39 and accompanying text supra.
53. 480 F.2d at 250.

54. One commentator has cautioned:
The words of the exception allow an employer to discriminate only when the
requires sex itself as a [bona fide occupational qualification], and not when
characteristics commonly associated with sex or the savings accompanying
crimination on the basis of sex make the job's operation more profitable to

job
the
disthe

employer. If the cost of changing a discriminatory hiring policy gave rise to a

[bona fide occupational qualification], it would allow an employer to enshrine the
status quo that the Act was meant to change.

Employment Discrimination,supra note 42, at 1180.
55. It should be noted in this regard, that plaintiff was obviously very anxious to
work the extra hours, indicating that the instances of Westinghouse's inconvenience
would be rare. 480 F.2d at 244.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
56. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
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DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY, JURISDICTION PROPERLY INACTION FOR DAMAGES BUT THE FACTS REQUIRE -A
AN
IN
VOKED

ANTITRUST

STAY RATHER THAN DISMISSAL.

Laveson v. Trans World Airlines (3d Cir. 1972)
In 1967, 12 domestic air carriers, including the defendants, sought
approval from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) of an agreement
providing for a $2.00 charge for visual in-flight entertainment on domestic

2
flights.' The CAB deferred final approval of the agreement, and issued
8
notice of proposed tariff amendments regarding in-flight entertainment.
4
On March 6, 1968, the CAB adopted the proposed tariff regulation, but
5
subsequently stayed its effectiveness. Alleging that defendants had con6
spired, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, to establish
a $2.00 visual in-flight entertainment fee for coach passengers while providing visual in-flight entertainment free of charge to first-class passengers,
plaintiffs, coach passengers on defendants' flights, filed a federal class action
9
suit7 seeking treble damages 8 instead of filing a complaint with the CAB.
The district court dismissed the case holding that the action was subject
to the primary jurisdiction of the CAB.' 0 The Third Circuit vacated the
district court's order and remanded the case, holding that while the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was proper, rather than dismissing the case, the district court should have stayed the action. Laveson
v. Trans World Airlines, 471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972).

1. The CAB has authority over contracts and agreements between air carriers
relating to transportation rates, fares, charges, and the regulation of competition.
All such agreements must be filed with the agency. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1382 (1970). Agreements approved by the CAB exempt the parties from the
operation of the antitrust laws "insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to
do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order." Id. § 1384.
2. Laveson v, TWA, 471 F.2d 76. 78 (3d Cir. 1972) ; 32 Fed. Reg. 4086 (1967).
The CAB did suggest, however, that a fee of less than $2.00 for a full length motion
picture would be unreasonable. 471 F.2d at 78; 32 Fed. Reg. 4087 (1967). Approval
was deferred because the CAB thought that the implementation of such a charge
would be accomplished more appropriately by the exercise of its rate-making
and rulemaking power. Implementation in such a manner would extend the rate to
all carriers. Id.
3. The proposed amendments provided that in the absence of a contrary showing, a tariff providing for a charge of less than $2.00 for visual entertainment would
be considered unjust and unreasonable and subject to suspension and investigation.
471 F.2d at 78; 32 Fed. Reg. 4076 (1967).
4. 471 F.2d at 78; 14 C.F.R. § 221.38(a) (1968) (adding subparagraphs (a) (8)
and (a) (9)). The rules deleted all reference to the $2.00 minimum charge, but the
CAB noted that it expected to use the $2.00 fee as a standard for testing the reasonableness of tariffs filed. 471 F.2d at 78; 33 Fed. Reg. 4456 (1968).
5. The stay was announced because a number of objections to the rule were filed.
471 F.2d at 79; 33 Fed. Reg. 6241 (1968). The stay was in force at the time this
action was commenced. 471 F.2d at 79. The regulations were subsequently reenacted. 14 C.F.R. § 221.38(a) (1973).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
7. 471 F.2d at 77.
8. Plaintiffs originally sought both damages and injunctive relief, but in response to defendants' motion to dismiss or stay the action, filed an amended complaint demanding only damages. Id. at 79.
Published by Villanova
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of Law Digital
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is essentially a flexible method
of allocating decisionmaking responsibility on particular issues between
a court and an administrative agency." The doctrine was first enunciated
12
by the Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,
wherein the issue raised was whether the state court or the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) should decide the reasonableness of certain
railroad rates. The Court found that the ICC had been vested with the
power to establish uniform nondiscriminatory rates, and held that uniformity was best achieved by delegating the initial determination of the
reasonableness of rates to the ICC. 13 The need for uniformity of regulation
was thus the criterion initially established for guiding the decision of
4
whether first resort should be to the regulatory agency or to the courts.1
In Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 15 the first modification of the doctrine appeared. The Court therein characterized the issue
which concerned the construction of a tariff as a question of law and held
that the doctrine was inapplicable. 16 The Court, however, did state that
where the inquiry was essentially one of fact involving technical matters,
uniformity could be achieved only if the determination were left to the
agency. 17 It was in Great Northern then that expertise, the second criterion
recognized by the Court as a rationale for deferring, initially, to administrative agencies, was introduced.'
Thus, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction grew from a combination of the need to obtain uniformity of
regulation and the desire to maximize the effectiveness of administrative
expertise. 19 The Abilene and Great Northern cases, the two cornerstone
decisions for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, did not involve violations
of antitrust laws. In those cases the question was simply which forum, the
court or the agency, was better equipped to decide the substantive issues
arising under a single statute. In the antitrust field, the jurisdictional
11. One court has stated that "the outstanding feature of the doctrine is properly
said to be its flexibility, permitting the courts to make a workable allocation of business between themselves and the agencies." CAB v. Modern Air Transp., Inc., 179
F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Fox, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated
Industries: A Reappraisal of the Role of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 2
MEMPH. ST. L. Rv. 279, 282 (1972).
12. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
13. Id. at 441.
14. See Fox, supra note 11, at 283. See generally Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315 (1956) ; Von Mehren,
The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARV. L. REv. 929 (1954).
15. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
16. Id. at 290-91.
17. Id. at 291.
18. The Court stated:
Moreover, that determination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with many
intricate facts of transportation is indispensible; and such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in a body of experts.
Id. 19. Fox, supra note 11, at 283.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
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question becomes more complex since both regulatory and antitrust stand20
ards are involved.
Whether competition or regulation is economically more desirable,
and which of these approaches offers the better protection of the public
interest are the basic policy issues in the application of the doctrine of
22
l
primary jurisdiction in the antitrust field. The Sherman 2 and Clayton
Acts were designed to protect interstate and foreign commerce from unlawful restraints of trade and monopolies. 28 On the other hand, administrative agencies were created because Congress felt a need to substitute
regulation for competition in some areas. 2 4 Certain of these regulatory

agencies have been empowered to immunize specified activities from the
operation of the antitrust laws, 25 thereby raising the problem of whether
or not the power of the courts to entertain antitrust suits has been entirely
supplanted or only limited in these areas by regulatory authority. 26 It is
clear, however, that when an agency is so empowered, approval of agreements submitted to it, subject to review by the courts, 2 7 will immunize such
28
agreements from the operation of antitrust laws.

Generally, the problems in the area of antitrust and primary jurisdiction arise when the plaintiff, in the belief that the regulatory agency is
industry-oriented and the antitrust standards are more rigorous, seeks to
avoid the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction by structuring
his complaint so as to avoid agency action. 29
Due to the numerous complex regulatory statutes, the history of the
application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to the antitrust field is
somewhat confusing. However, the leading cases in this area may be
considered in two groups. The first group of cases expanded the principle
of administrative expertise to antitrust actions involving regulated industries.30 In these cases, the Court did not articulate the basic problem of
reconciling antitrust and regulatory statutes. The second group of cases,
while continuing to recognize the importance of administrative expertise,
began to consider the scope of the statutes which conferred power upon
20. Id. at 284. See Petrucelli & Long, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries:
The Role of the "Doctrine" of Primary Jurisdiction,2 TOL. L. REv. 303 (1969).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-44 (1970).
23. See C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1-18
(1940).
24. See Pan Am.World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 300-01
(1963).
25. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970).
26. Fox, supra note 11, at 284. See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L.
REV. 1037, 1060 (1964).
27. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1970). See also Von
Mehren, supra note 14, at 960-65.
28. See, e.g., McManus v. Lake Cent. Airlines, Inc., 327 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1964).
29. See Von Mehren, supra note 14, at 941-42. Compare Slick Airways, Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 160
(1953), with Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 107
F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
30. See,
e.g., United
Co.
S.S. Co., 284
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1973U.S. 474 (1932);
accord, Far E. Corf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 7

DECEMBER

1973]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

the agency; that is, whether the regulatory statute empowered the agency
to render a decision on the challenged activities. 3 ' However, it was not
until the opinion of Mr. Justice White in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea32 that criteria for determining the application of the
3
doctrine of primary jurisdiction to the field of antitrust began to unfold. 3
Jewel Tea involved a private antitrust action initiated by a supermarket chain challenging a provision in its collective bargaining agreement
which limited the operating hours of its meat departments. The union
claimed this provision was a "term or condition of employment," and as
such was subject to the labor exemption of the antitrust laws.3 4 In rejecting the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, Mr. Justice
White set forth the criteria for allocating the decisionmaking process when
determining antitrust immunity: the court's competence to proceed on its
38
37
36
own, 35 and the need, utility, and availability of an agency decision.

In Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,"9 the Court articulated another criterion for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to
antitrust actions. Plaintiffs therein filed a treble damage antitrust action
alleging that the defendants had initiated and maintained a rate increase
in order to implement certain rate-making agreements which were never
approved by the Federal Maritime Commission.40 The approach adopted
by the Carnation Court was to consider whether or not the agreements
were debatably legal. Under the Court's interpretation of the Shipping
31. See Fox, supra note 11, at 287-89, citing United States v. Philadelphia

Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) ; California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) ; United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); Federal Maritime Bd. v.
Isbrandsten, 356 U.S. 481 (1954).
32. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). There was no majority opinion in Jewel Tea. However, of the three opinions filed, primary jurisdiction was discussed only in Justice
White's opinion and his statements were not contradicted in the other opinions.
33. See Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction To Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction:
A Practical Approach To The Allocation of Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812 (1967).
34. 381 U.S. at 679-84..
35. Mr. Justice White recognized that the NLRB has special competence in
resolving the challenged actions, but that this expertise is not exclusive, and that
in many areas "the courts are themselves not without experience in classifying bargaining subjects as terms or conditions of employment." Id. at 685-86.
36. Mr. Justice White stated:
[T]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not a doctrine of futility: it does
not require resort to "an expensive and merely delaying administrative proceeding
when the case must eventually be decided on a controlling legal issue wholly
unrelated to determinations for the ascertainment of which the proceeding was
sent to the agency."
Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
37. In the Jewel Tea situation, the NLRB could never reach the antitrust question raised by the employer because of the absence of an available procedure for
obtaining a Board determination. Id. at 687.
38. For a recent application of the Jewel Tea decision, see International. Ass'n
of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass'n, No.
71-1947 (3d Cir., filed July 17, 1973), where the court applied the language of the
opinion of Mr. Justice White and concluded that the facts of the case called for the
NLRB to make "initial fact finding for the resolution of the labor issues." Id. at 33.
39. 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
40. Id. at'215.
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Act, 41 all unfiled agreements were unlawful and not debatably legal.
42
Therefore, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was not applicable.
The Carnation Court indicated that its opinion did not conflict with
the earlier decision in United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship
Co. 43 wherein the Court had held that the challenged practices should be
considered by the Shipping Board even though the agreements had not been
filed for Board approval. 4 4 In Cunard, the plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief;" in Carnation the action was for treble damages. Since all unfiled
agreements were unlawful, damages could be awarded in Carnationfor the
period during which the agreements were not approved. The Carnation
Court also ruled against referral to the Shipping Board because the Board
had already construed its order and had found the alleged conduct to be a
violation. 4" However, the Court stayed the action 47 because the agency
48
order was being appealed.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs attempted to by-pass the regulatory
scheme of the CAB by alleging that (1) the challenged agreements had
not been approved, and therefore, antitrust immunity could not be invoked
since the alleged conspiracy could not be claimed to have been necessary
to do anything authorized, approved, or required by CAB order;49 and
(2) the remedy sought - treble damages - could not be provided by
the CAB. 50
The treatment of the plaintiffs' contention that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not apply to agreements which had not been approved
by the CAB was foreseeable. After recognizing the overriding interest of
the CAB in the regulation of in-flight entertainment, the court applied the
holding of Cunard and the later decision in Far East Conference v. United
States5 ' on unfiled agreements.5 2 The fact that the challenged actions had
not been approved was immaterial if a decision by the court might conflict
with future CAB approval of the agreements. 53 Since the Cunard and Far
East decisions were limited by Carnation to cases where injunctive relief
is sought, 54 the plaintiffs, with a prayer for treble damages, sought sanctuary
in the Carnation decision.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
383 U.S. at 216-18.
284 U.S. 474 (1932).
Id. at 487; accord, Far E Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
284 U.S. at 478.
383 U.S. at 223.

In deciding to stay the actions rather than to dismiss it, the Court held that,
"a treble-damage action for past conduct cannot be easily re-instituted at a later time.
Such claims are subject to the Statute of Limitations and are likely to be barred by
the time the Commission acts." Id.
48. Id.
49. 471 F.2d at 80-81.

50. Id. at 81.
51. 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
52. 471 F.2d at 81-82.
53. Id. University
at 81.
Published by Villanova
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54. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 220-22 (1966).
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365

In Carnation, the unapproved agreements were clearly unlawful under
the Shipping Act, and whether or not the agreement was immunized prospectively, damages were awardable for the period during which the
challenged agreements were not approved. Under the Shipping Act such
agreements were not debatably lawful. The statute conferring upon the
CAB the power to immunize agreements from the operation of the antitrust
laws does not state that such unapproved agreements are unlawful per se. 55
The challenged activity was "debatably lawful" if the CAB had the power
to immunize, retroactively, pre-approval conduct.56 The court's application
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was, therefore, consistent with the
7
theory announced in Carnation."
The court's treatment of the issue of "retroactive immunization" might,
however, leave the opinion open to criticism. The question of the CAB's
authority to retroactively immunize agreements is a question of statutory
58
interpretation, and statutory interpretation is a question for the court.
However, even critics of judicial abdications in the face of a regulatory
scheme can find little fault with the court's rationale for referring the issue
of retroactive immunization to the CAB. The court was interested in
knowing the effect of retroactive immunity upon the regulatory scheme,5 9
and recognized the value of the opinion of the Board which implements
that scheme.
Although the application by the district court of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction was approved, the court, because of the nature of the relief
sought - treble damages - did not affirm the dismissal of the action.
Sensitive to the petition of the plaintiff, the court stayed the action pending
consideration by the CAB. 60 In this way, the court did not block any avenues of relief.6 1 If the CAB does not approve the challenged agreements,
55. See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970).

56. 471 F.2d at 83.
57. A Supreme Court decision subsequent to Laveson supports the court's holding. In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973), the Court held
that prior agency adjudication of the antitrust dispute would be a material aid in
ultimately deciding whether the Commodity Exchange Act foreclosed the suit; the
action was stayed pending agency review. See also Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA,
409 U.S. 363 (1973); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
58. Prior to the cases cited in note 57 supra, one commentator stated, regarding
issues of statutory interpretation: "Indeed, in none of the more recent cases has the
Supreme Court shown any hesitancy in arriving at its decision as to antitrust
immunity without seeking the aid of the relevant agency." Fox, supra note 11, at 295.
In fact, the question of the CAB's authority to retroactively immunize agreements
among carriers had already been given consideration. In Butler Aviation Co. v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 389 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1968), the court held:
We read § 414 [of the Federal Aviation Act] and similar provisions in other
statutes, such as § 5(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act . . . as declaring that
in the areas there delimited the public interest demands that if a transaction has
survived examination by the appropriate regulatory agency, antitrust peace
shall prevail ....
Id. at 521. See Interstate Inv., Inc. v. Transcontinental Bus Sys., Inc., 310 F. Supp.
1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 819.
59. 471 F.2d at 83 n.50.
60. Id. at 84.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
61. See generally Von Mehren, supra note 14, at 952.
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the action will not be barred by the statute of limitations. If approval by
the Board is given, but no retroactive immunity is granted, damages may
be awarded for the period during which the agreement was unapproved. If
the agreements are approved and the Board and court agree that retroactive
immunity is authorized by the statute, the plaintiff will be without remedy.
On the other hand, considering the reliance which the court placed
upon FarEast, Cunard, and Carnation,if the plaintiff had sought injunctive
relief, it is clear that the action would have been dismissed. Since the CAB
does have the power to grant a cease and desist order 2 and the plaintiff
would always be able to re-institute his action for injunctive relief in the
63
court, his position would not have been prejudiced by dismissal.
The instant opinion demonstrates this court's respect for an agency's
expert opinion, even when that opinion concerns the limits of the agency's
authority. The approach taken to the criterion of debatable legality, as set
forth in Carnation, makes it questionable whether, except in the most
extreme cases, the Third Circuit would declare any challenged agreements
"not arguably lawful" - that is, not within the purview of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine.
I. L. C.
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NLRB v. Irvin (3d Cir. 1973)
The Irvin-McKelvy Company (Employer), a company engaged in
construction work for coal mine operators, entered into a collective bargaining agreement 1 with International Union of District 50, Allied and
62. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
63. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. at 222-23.
1. The contract was authorized by section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations
Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). Section 8(f) allows an employer in the
building and construction industry to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
with a union before its majority status has been established in accordance with
section 9 of the Act. Section 8(f) provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their
employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a
labor organization of which building and construction employees are members
(not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a)
of this section as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority status of
such labor
organization
notSchool
been of
established
the provisions
of section
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1973
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Technical Workers of the United States (District 50) in 1964.2 The
3
agreement, which was subsequently converted into a project contract,
4
contained union security and dues check-off clauses.
Late in 1968 the Employer became signatory to an agreement with the
United Mine Workers of America (UMW). 5 The Employer continued
to recognize District 50, under the revised 1964 contract, as the bargaining
agent on existing projects until April 1, 1969, when it concluded that
District 50 projects were substantially complete. The Employer thereupon
repudiated the District 50 contract and applied the provisions of the UMW
contract to all its employees. 6 In response, District 50 charged the Employer with violations of sections 8(a) (1), (2), (3), and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (Act).7 The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) found, first, that by repudiating the District 50 contract
and recognizing the UMW as the representative of the employees on unfinished projects, the Employer had violated sections 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (2)
of the Act, and second, that by requiring District 50 members working on
unfinished projects to join the UMW as a condition of continued employment, the Employer had violated sections 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (1). The
NLRB further concluded that while the Employer, after termination of
the District 50 contract, was free to enter into subsequent 8(f) agreements
with other unions, it could only do so providing that a majority of the
work force was not District 50 members.8 On the Employer's motion for
nothing in this subsection shall set aside the final proviso to subsection (a)(3)
of this section: Provided further, That any agreement which would be invalid,
but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant
to section 159(c) or 159(e) of this title.

Id. § 158(f).
2. NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265, 1267 (3d Cir. 1973).
3. Id. at 1267. In 1967 the original agreement was supplanted by an industrywide contract which was to be effective until 1970. The 1967 agreement contained a
clause giving the Employer the benefit of any more favorable provisions in subsequent
contracts entered into by District 50 with other employers. Pursuant to this provision,
the agreement was converted from a specified term contract into a project contract
in 1968 after District 50 had entered into a "project only" contract with another
employer. Under a project contract, the bargaining unit is the group of employees
at a particular project, and the contract is effective only for the duration of the
project. Id.
4. Id. at 1267, 1271.
5. Id. at 1267. At this time, the Employer's customers advised that UMW
labor was necessary before the construction contracts could be awarded. Id.
6. Id. at 1268.
7. Id. The provisions alleged to be violated, as a result of the withdrawal of
recognition from District 50 and the recognition of the UMW, provide in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization . . . ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (2), (3), (5) (1970).
8. David F. Irvin and James P. McKelvy, 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 53 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
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clarification of the order, the NLRB stated that whenever the employer
utilized a work force on any project, old or new, a majority of which was
District 50 members it could not contract with any other union. 9
On petition by the NLRB for enforcement of its order, the Third
Circuit held that the Employer had not violated sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (2)
or 8(a) (3) of the Act, but violated section 8(a) (5) by unilaterally substituting the UMW contract for the District 50 contract at three or four
unfinished projects. The court, however, denied enforcement of the order
since it considered that the need for injunctive relief may no longer have
been present. 10 NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1973).
Section 8(f) of the Act, adopted by amendment in 1959,1" permits an
employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to
enter into a prehire agreement which requires union membership as a
condition of employment despite the undetermined majority status of the
union. 12 One of the major considerations underlying the amendment was
the fact that the employment relationship in the construction industry has
a transitory nature - projects are often of short duration, and the employee
often works for more than one employer.' 3 Collective bargaining agreements
were permitted to be made between employers and unions for jobs not yet
begun for two reasons: first, the employer's need to know his labor costs
so that he could calculate and submit bids; and second, the nature of the
business necessitated an available supply of skilled craftsmen for quick referral. 1 4 It was in light of these considerations that the Irvin court reviewed
the decision of the NLRB.
The first question presented for the Irvin court's consideration was
whether a construction employer, whose business has more than one bargaining unit, could make a section 8(f) agreement with a new union without a representation election, where the new bargaining unit contained
employees who had become members of the first union by operation of
union security provisions in the first contract. 15 The NLRB, relying upon
9. Id. at 52 n.*.

Where there is a lack of compliance with an order, as was true in the instant
case, the NLRB is authorized by section 10(e) of the Act to apply for enforcement.
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).

10. 475 F.2d at 1271. The Third Circuit denied enforcement with respect to the
section 8(a) (5) violation because the passage of time had eliminated the necessity for
such action. Projects in progress on April 1, 1969 were, in all probability, completed
during the 4 year period between the violation and the court's, decision. However, the
court granted the General Counsel 30 days in which to file a response indicating any
reasons which supported enforcement of the NLRB order. Id.
11. Section 8(f) was enacted as section 705 of the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970). See 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1970).
12. See note 1 supra.
13. The problems facing construction employers and the purposes behind the
amendment of the Act are discussed in S. REP. No. 185, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-29
(1959); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1959).
14. S. REP. No. 185, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1959); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959).
15. 475 F.2d at 1267. This first question was related to the Employer's recogof theUniversity
UMW Charles
on newWidger
projects.
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the employer neutrality doctrine of Midwest Piping & Supply Co.,' 6 had
contended that the Employer had to resort to representation proceedings as
specified in the Act 1 7 before entering into another contract.' 8 The court
found, however, that Midwest Piping was not controlling because section
8(f) excused the construction industry employer from the duty of neutrality,' 9 the breach of which would ordinarily result in a violation of
sections 8(a) (1), (2), and (3) of the Act.20 Therefore, the Employer was
permitted under section 8(f), to enter into a contract with a new union
for subsequent projects, irrespective of the union membership of the
prospective employees. 2 ' That right to contract with a new union for
subsequent contracts is subject, however, to the right of the employees in
the bargaining unit, and the prior union, to request a representation election
to oust the new union. 22 Thus, although the employer is free to enter into
prehire contracts with a different union, there is no guarantee that the
contract will remain effective should there be a representation election pur23
suant to section 9(c) of the Act.
The second question considered by the Irvin court was whether a
construction employer could repudiate a section 8(f) contract which
contained union security provisions that had been continuously enforced,
and proceed, without a representation election, to apply a new section
8(f) contract covering a bargaining unit consisting of employees who had
been subject to the repudiated contract. 24 The court concluded that the
right of a construction employer under section 8(f) to ignore the normal
neutrality requirement and provide assistance to a union by entering into
a pre-hire collective bargaining agreement did not relieve the employer
of his obligation to bargain collectively with the representative of the
existing bargaining unit during the term of the agreement. 25 The Employer had contended that his refusal to bargain with District 50 after
putting the UMW contract into effect was not a violation of section
8(a) (5) because District 50 was not a bargaining representative that was
selected by a majority of the employees for collective bargaining pur16. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). Midwest Piping established the employer's duty
of neutrality. The NLRB therein declared that it was an unfair labor practice for
an employer to recognize one of the two rival unions during the pendency of a representation dispute.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
18. 475 F.2d at 1270.
19. Id.
20. See 63 N.L.R.B. at 1070.
21. 475 F.2d at 1270.
22. Id. According to section 9(c), any employee or labor organization may file
a petition with the NLRB alleging that the labor organization currently recognized
by the employer as bargaining representative, is no longer the employee's representative. Upon a finding of reasonable cause to believe a question of representation exists,
the NLRB will hold a hearing, and, if appropriate, will order an election. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1970).
23. 475 F.2d at 1270.
24. Id. This second question related to the incompleted projects as of the time
of the repudiation.
25. Id. at 1271.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
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poses as required by section 9(a)*26 The contention was based upon the
NLRB's decision in R.J. Smith Construction Co.,27 which, as interpreted
by the Employer, left a construction employer free to repudiate a collective bargaining agreement made pursuant to section 8(f) with one union,
28
and substitute a new contract with another union.
The Third Circuit rejected the Employer's interpretation of section
8(f), declaring that nothing in section 8(f) suggested that "it was intended to leave construction industry employers free to repudiate contracts at will." 29 The court, however, expressly limited its holding that

an employer is not free to repudiate his section 8(f) contract during its
term to the instant situation, where the union's role as representative
had been directly presented to the employees through the enforcement of
union security and dues checkoff clauses, and, the employees had refrained from seeking a representation election for a sustained period
of time.30
The issue that remains open after this decision is the general effect
of section 8(f) upon the construction industry employer's obligation to
bargain in good faith with the collective bargaining representative during
the term of a section 8(f) agreement. In the instant decision, the court
did not express an opinion as to the propriety of the NLRB's decision in
R.J. Smith Construction Co.81 In that case, the NLRB inferred that in
some situations a rebuttable presumption of majority status of the signatory union may occur as a result of a section 8(f) contract, which would
give rise to an obligation of the employer to bargain with the union
regarding terms in the contract.3 2 However, the NLRB declared that the
presumption of majority status could be contested by the employer at any
time during the term of the contract - not limiting such a contest to a
33
petition for election pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e) of the Act.
26. Id. at 1270. The basis of the Employer's argument was that District 50 had
been given bargaining status by the Employer through section 8(f), and not by a
majority of the employees in the unit. Since District 50 was not the exclusive section
9(c) representative, the Employer contended that he was under no obligation to
bargain with it. Id.
27. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971).
28. 475 F.2d at 1270.
29. Id. at 1271.
30. Id.
31. In R.I. Smith Construction Co., a construction industry employer and a union
had entered into a section 8(f) prehire agreement which contained no union security
provisions. During the course of the contract, the employer, without notice to the
signatory union, unilaterally changed the wages of a particular class of employees.

The union brought section 8(a) (5) charges against the employer for failure to bargain with the collective bargaining representative of the employees regarding the
contract changes. The NLRB found that the employer had not violated section
8(a) (5) because the union had, in fact, never represented a majority of the employees
and, therefore, the employer had no duty to bargain over any changes irrespective of
the existence of the prehire collective bargaining agreement. 191 N.L.R.B. at 695.
32. Id. at 695 n.5. The Third Circuit noted that the NLRB in R.J. Smith Construction Co. inferred that the employer may not be free to repudiate a section 8(f)
contract during its term if the contract contained union security clauses which were
enforced. 475 F.2d at 1269.
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The Irvin decision could be read as rejecting the NLRB's construction of section 8(f) in R.J. Smith Construction Co. The Third Circuit
noted, without disapproval, the General Counsel's interpretation of section 8(f), that once an employer executes a section 8(f) agreement, he
may not change the collective bargaining representative except by means
of a section 9(c) or section 9(e) representation election. 84 This would
appear to be the proper interpretation of section 8(f), since the express
language of the section limits the effects of its provisions, particularly the
final proviso which "supplies an unmistakable guide to Congress' desire
to immunize from liability only the preliminary contractual steps which
precede an employer's acquisition of a work force on a project . . .
It is submitted that that proviso does not, as the NLRB suggested in R.J.
Smith Construction Co., permit the indiscriminate testing of the union's
majority status by an employer at any time during the term of the project,
but rather limits such a test of majority status to petitions for repre6
sentation elections through sections 9(c) and 9(e) .3
The effect of allowing the employer to repudiate a section 8(f)
contract, which contains no union security provisions, at any time merely
by claiming a lack of majority status of the union would be to render the
prehire contract meaningless.3 7 It would seem that if Congress had intended to abrogate the existing law regarding good faith bargaining during the term of a validly executed section 8(f) contract, it would have
been such a deviation from the norm as to require an express declaration.
In fact, the only indication that such contracts differ at all from other
lawful collective bargaining agreements, once executed, is that section
8(f) contracts are not a bar to representation petitions filed pursuant to
sections 9(c) and 9(e). 38
It is submitted that the suggested interpretation of the operation of
section 8(f) with respect to the obligation of a construction industry
employer to bargain with the signatory union of a section 8(f) contract
during its term, is the interpretation which would be applied by the Third
Circuit if presented with a case involving an employer repudiation of a
section 8(f) collective bargaining agreement containing no union security
clauses. Although the court expressly declined to suggest its ruling in
such a situation, it did declare that there was nothing in the text or legislative history of section 8(f) to suggest that construction industry employers could freely repudiate such contracts. 9 The court also noted,
without apparent disapproval, the adoption of the suggested interpreta34. 475 F.2d at 1269.
35. 191 N.L.R.B. at 694.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970). See also note 1 supra. It should be noted
in this regard that a representation election pursuant to sections 9(c) or 9(e) is the
only method for testing majority status expressly recognized in the final proviso of

section 8(f). 29 U.S.C. 158(f) (1970).
37. 191 N.L.R.B. at 696 (dissenting opinion).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970). See 191 N.L.R.B. at 696 n.7 and accompanying
text (dissenting opinion).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
39. 475 F.2d at 1271.
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tion of the effects of section 8(f) by the dissent in R.J. Smith Construction Co. 40 That, it is submitted, represents an apparent inclination to
interpret section 8(f) as applying an exception to the existing law with
respect to union recognition only as pertains to the prehire agreement,
and not as being a change in the law regarding the employer's obligation
to bargain with the union representative during the course of a contract,
unless a representation election during its term results in a change in the
collective bargaining representative.
The Irvin court has clarified section 8(f) as it pertains to a construction industry employer's ability to make successive section 8(f)
contracts for new projects irrespective of his knowledge of union membership of the prospective employees on those new projects. It has also
established, at least in cases involving collective bargaining agreements
containing enforced union security and dues checkoff provisions, that a
section 8(f) contract cannot be freely repudiated by an employer during
its term. Although the application of that rule to contracts not containing
such provisions was specifically reserved for an appropriate case, such
application would appear to be both logical and probable.
J.M.F.
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In re Penn Central Transportation Co. (3d Cir. 1973)
The trustees of the property of the Penn Central Transportation
Company (Penn Central) petitioned the reorganization court 1 for authorization to undertake improvements on the company's freight yard at
40. As the Irvin court noted:
Without suggesting how we would rule if presented with the repudiation
during its term by a § 8(f) employer of a collective bargaining agreement containing no union security provisions [noting the dissent in R.J. Smith Construction Co.] . . . . [ilt is significant, we think, that despite the instant contract
provisions and their enforcement, the employees did not, from June, 1964 to April,
1969, petition for a representation election. There was at least tacit acquiescence
in the designation of District 50 as collective bargaining representative.
Id.
1. The reorganization court was the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judge Fullam presiding. The Penn Central petitioned for reorganization on June 21, 1970, under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,
which governs reorganization of railroads. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). For a history
and discussion of railroad reorganization see Haskell, Railroad Reorganization for
Beginners, 24 ALA. L. REV. 295 (1972); Lasdon, The Evolution of Railroad Reorganization, 88 BANK. L.J. 3 (1971). For additional information on the rise and fall
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Selkirk, New York,2 and for permission to take-down certain escrowed
funds with which to finance the improvements.8 The Selkirk properties
were subject to three mortgages, referred to collectively as the Hudson
River Mortgages. 4 The funds sought by the Penn Central trustees were
liened proceeds from the sale of properties subject to these mortgages.5
The reorganization court held that the proposed improvements would
constitute "additions and betterments" to the freight yard and permitted
the use of the escrowed funds to carry them out. 7 On appeal by the most
junior mortgagee, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (Morgan Guaranty),
the Third Circuit affirmed the reorganization court's decision, holding
that creditors' rights in the escrowed funds were protected by the reorganization court's finding that there was "no demonstrated likelihood"
that the reorganization would fail. In re Penn Central Transportation
Co., 474 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1973).
2. The yard at Selkirk is a railroad interchange located near Albany, New York.
It binds the Penn Central's rail services from New England and New York with
those from the West, and thus is a critical part of the Penn Central system.
3. The improvements were physical additions to the plant, including additional
track, a conductor's tower, and a bridge. These improvements were to result in an
annual savings of $1,076,000 through the elimination of delays and increased utilization of the yard.
4. These mortgages were created between 1897 and 1913 by the New York
Central and Hudson River Company, a predecessor of the Penn Central. Ownership
by the railroad of the main rail line along the Hudson resulted in the term "Hudson
River Mortgages." These mortgages were, in order of priority: (1) 3'/2%Gold
Bond Mortgage, dated June 1, 1897; (2) Consolidated Mortgage, dated Tune 20,
1913; and (3) Refunding and Improvements Mortgage, dated October 1, 1913. The
indenture trustee of this third mortgage was Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, the
petitioner on appeal.
5. Railroad mortgages are often open-ended, permitting a railroad to sell mortgaged property and replace it with property of equal value to which a lien attaches.
If property is sold but not replaced, the lien attaches to the sale proceeds. See Note,
Interim Financina Thrmugh Use of the Turnover Power in Railroad Reorganizations,.
71 YALE L.J. 1553, 1555 (1962). Under a similar system and pursuant to a 1961
agreement between Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, indenture trustee under
the first mortgage, and Penn Central's predecessor, the New York Central, proceeds
from the sales of mortgaged property were used by Manufacturers to finance the
purchase of rolling stock by the railroad under conditional sales agreements. The
repayments by the railroad were held in escrow, subiect to the mortgage. The trustees
in the instant case petitioned for $2,074,000, approximately $1,756,480 of which was
the product of these pre-reorganization sales. The remainder of the finds sought by
the trustees were to be obtained from two separate accounts, one of anproximately
$100,264. and the other $333,214. These funds were made up of proceeds from postreorganization sales of property, pursuant to prior orders of the reorganization court.
The authority for these orders derived from se-tion 77(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. . 205(a) (1970), which grants the reorganization court exclusive control
over the debtor's property, and section 77(o) which provides that proceeds from the
sales of mortgazed pronertv "be applied or disposed of in such manner as the judge ...
shall direct." 11 U.S.C. 205(o) (1970).
6. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Penn Central Trustees, 332 F. Supp. 1302, 1306
(E.D. Pa. 1971). See note 19 infra.
7. 332 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
8. The court also remanded with instructions that the reorgani7nat;on court
provide for the payment of interest on the pre-reorgnnization funds. 474 F.2d at 837.
The basis of this special treatment was that the right to these funds was unclear
because they were created prior to the reorganization. The court's order, requiring
repayment with interest, would restore the status oaio as to these contested funds.
Thus the case did not decide the ultimate right to the fund. For an explanation of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
the nature of the pre-reorganization funds, see note 5 supra.
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Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 9 contemplates reorganization rather
than liquidation of the debtor. 10 The statute's two basic objectives are
"the conservation of the debtor's assets for the benefit of creditors and
the preservation of an ongoing railroad in the public interest."" In the
interim period between the filing of the petition for reorganization and
the creation of a self-sustaining railroad, the debtor must continue to
operate, despite the fact that its revenues and other available financial
resources cannot meet its fixed costs (funded and unfunded debt, taxes,
and rentals on leased lines) and current operational expenses.' 2 The
continued operation of the railroad during this period may result in a
conflict between the interests of creditors and the interests of the public.
Where it is probable that the railroad can be returned to a profit making
system, the interests of the creditors and the public are both served by
reorganization. However, if the railroad is unlikely to ever turn a profit,
their interests diverge - the secured creditors' desire to lose as little as
possible might best be realized by liquidation, while the public interest
requires continued operation. In such circumstances, providing services
to the public at less than cost results in erosion of the assets which secure
the creditors' debts, and leads to the subordination of their security
interests to subsequently issued trustee's certificates.' 3
Similarly, take-downs for the purpose of "additions and betterments"
may be to the benefit of creditors if reorganization is successful; but if
it fails, the liquidation value of the "additions and betterments" is likely
to be substantially less than the going-concern value.' 4 For this reason
courts have recognized that at some point the forced investment by way
of take-downs for the purpose of "additions and betterments" may result
in an unconstitutional taking of property,' 5 and have sought to draw
a line beyond which the public interest in continued rail service cannot
infringe on creditors' rights in the debtor's property. The case of In re
9. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
10. Bankruptcy Act § 77(b), 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970). See, e.g., New
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 431 (1970); 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
77.01, at 466.4 (14th ed. 1972).
11. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 431 (1970). The public interest

in continued rail operation has long been recognized. See 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 10,
3 77.02, at 469. For a discussion of the statutory and judicial recognition of the public
nature of railroads, see Haskell, supra note 1, at 303-05.
12. For a more detailed discussion of costs, see Haskell, supra note 1, at 308-12.
13. Id. at 298-306. It is apparent that if the railroad is operating, and making
needed repairs and improvements, but revenues are not meeting the cost of this
operation, the funds must come from other sources. These other sources are: (1)

cash on hand, usually nonexistent in the case of an insolvent; (2) turnover orders,
as in the instant case; or (3) the sale of trustee's certificates which create a lien on
the debtor's assets which takes priority over previously outstanding security interests.
See Note, supra note 5, at 1564.

14. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
15. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private property
be t,,ken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See
note Charles
1,at 305-08.
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New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.'6 (New Haven) established
four criteria to be evaluated and satisfied before a court could draw-down
liened mortgage proceeds for the purpose of making "additions and betterments" in a section 77 reorganization:
The rule for a reorganization under Sec. 77, in a case such as
that now before the court and at this early stage of the proceedings,
is that (1) in addition to finding that the funds are presently needed
and cannot be obtained elsewhere. (2) the court need only conclude
that reorganization is probably feasible, (3) that the money drawndown and expended for additions and betterments will materially
contribute to the possibility of successful reorganization and to the
continuation of the transportation plant, or a substantial part thereof,
as a going concern, and17(4) that the interests of the bondholders are
not thereby prejudiced.
The New Haven test was endorsed, but not actually applied, by the
Third Circuit in Central R.R. of N.J. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.' 8 In that case, the proposed expenditure was for removal of a damaged span of a two-span drawbridge. The court held that removal of the
damaged span would not be an "addition or betterment" and that the
liened assets in question could not be utilized to defray such an operational expense unless substitute security of equivalent value was pro20
vided.' 9 While the court discussed the New Haven test with approval,
it expressly stated that there was no need for the application of the test
since the indenture trustee did not resist the take-down of funds, but only
contended that some substitute security be provided.2 1 The Third Circuit
16. No. 30226 (D. Conn., Dec. 7, 1961). The court in the New Haven case was

also faced with the issue of the constitutional propriety of a request for take-down

at an early stage in the reorganization proceedings. The court, after application of
the four criteria announced by it, approved the take-down. For additional discussion,
see note 17 infra.
17. Id. (enumeration added). The New Haven court, in deriving this test, relied
heavily on In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952), a
Chapter X reorganization case involving the take-down of mortgage proceeds for
use as working capital. The test of Third Avenue required that the feasibility of
reorganization be established to almost a certainty before a draw-down would be
permitted. The New Haven court stressed its belief that such a stringent requirement
was inapplicable in a section 77 context because of the overriding public interest
present when the court is dealing with a railroad. The court's rationale extended
to those Chapter X cases in which draw-downs were sought for "additions and
betterments." The court concluded that Chapter X cases, while analogous in general
principles to section 77 reorganization proceedings, were inapposite to the discussion
of the criteria to be applied in a section 77 case. Chapter X cases involving the issue
of feasibility of reorganization criterion include: In re Riker Corp., 385 F.2d 124
(3d Cir. 1967) ; Harding v. Stichman, 240 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1957) ; and In re Flying
W Airways, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
18. 421 F.2d 604 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 949 (1970).
19. Expenditures for "additions and betterments" increase the operational plant,
and the assets purchased are subject to the creditors' lien, thus affording them a
substitute security for the cash draw-down. Expenditures for operating expenses
are dissipated without the generation of substitute security upon which a mortgage
lien can attach. The creditors' benefit, if any, is intangible - the continued operation
of the railroad. Id. at 607.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
20. Id. at 606.
21. Id. at 608.
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did apply the New Haven test in a subsequent case which arose out of
the Penn Central proceedings.2 2 The court there held that it was improper
for the district court to release property from the Hudson River Mortgages
when the record did not contain support for the district court's statement
that there was a "reasonable prospect of a successful reorganization. '23
In the instant case, Morgan Guaranty contended that the reorganization court had improperly permitted a dissipation of Morgan Guaranty's security in the assets of the Penn Central. The order of the
reorganization court provided that the escrowed funds utilized to finance
the improvements were to be repayed from the proceeds of sales of other
property subject to the mortgages. 24 The court analyzed the economic
effect of that order by comparing the position of the security holders
before and after its implementation. Before the order, the bondholders'
security consisted of a freight yard, easily disposable property, and the
escrowed funds. After implementation, their security would consist of
an improved freight yard, a replenished escrow account equal to that on
hand before the order, and a diminished amount of easily disposable
property.2 5 In the event the reorganization was unsuccessful, the security
of the bondholders would be an interest in the improvements. Such an
interest might provide adequate security if the railroad continued to
operate, but its value would be substantially less in the event of liquidation, while easily disposable property would retain its value upon liquidation. 26 Thus, the effect of the order was to force the mortgage holders
to contribute to the effort to return the Penn Central to financial solvency,
by further entangling their funds with the railroad's operation.21 The
issue before the court was the constitutional propriety of this order, i.e.,
whether it was designed to guard the rights of creditors while respecting
the interests of the public in the survival of the railroad as a going enterprise, or whether it went beyond that and resulted in an unconstitutional
taking of private property in violation of the fifth amendment.
The court initially determined that the standard to be applied, in
reviewing the constitutionality of the reorganization court's order, was
the New Haven test which it had endorsed in Central of New Jersey.28
As the reorganization court had applied this same test in reaching its
determination,2 9 the court limited its analysis to a review of the reorganization court's findings with regard to the New Haven requirements,
focusing principally on the "probably feasible" criterion. 30 Morgan Guar22. In re Penn Central, 468 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), rev'g 346 F. Supp. 1323 (1972).
23. Id. at 1227.
24. 474 F.2d at 835.
25. Id.
26. See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHi.
L. Rv. 565, 566 (1950).
27. 474 F.2d at 835.
28. Id. at 833.
29. University
332 F. Supp.
at 1304.
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anty contended that the trustees had failed to show that reorganization
of the Penn Central was "probably feasible." The problem with respect
to this element of the test was that at the time the reorganization court's
decision approving the take-down was rendered, the reorganization proceedings were only a few months old, and the trustees had not yet formulated a plan of reorganization. However, the court circumvented this
difficulty by adopting a reformulation of the "probably feasible" test
which took into account the early stage of the proceedings and the unavailability of a plan of reorganization:
Where, as in the present instance, the issue arises at a relatively
early stage of the reorganization proceeding, when it is too early to
make confident predictions one way or the other, I believe it should
be sufficient to find merely that there is no demonstrated likelihood
of failure.3'
While the effect of this reformulated test was to reduce the burden of
proof which the reorganization trustees were required to meet, the court
made it clear that the burden would not shift to the indenture trustee.32
On the facts, there were two factors which indicated that the bondholders had not been prejudiced by the court's holding. First, although
not discussed by the court, the security of the bondholders had been
previously increased by $26 million in the form of "additions and betterments," prompting the reorganization court to suggest that the reorganization trustees might be entitled to the outright release of the escrowed
funds. 33 Second, the improvements were made to an important rail yard
which would no doubt be preserved through nationalization or government subsidies, even if an income-based reorganization did not become a
reality.3 4 However, given a different factual situation in which the above
two mitigating factors are not present, it is questionable whether a test
requiring merely a showing that "reorganization (is] not improbable"' 5
31. Id. at 836 (emphasis added). This reformulation of the feasibility of reorganization requirement was proposed and applied by the reorganization court. 332
F. Supp. at 1305. It is interesting to note that the court in the New Haven case
created and applied the "probably feasible" test for just such an early stage in the
reorganization proceedings. There the test was applied before any plan for reorganization had been submitted, less than 42 months into the reorganization. The reorganization court in the instant case stated that the prospects for a successful reorganization were "undoubtedly at least as good as were the prospects . .. in the New
Haven case," but nevertheless felt that "some further refinement" of the test was
necessary. Id.
32. 474 F.2d at 837.
33. 332 F. Supp. at 1305.
34. Id. at 1306. See Note, supra note 5, at 1563. Recent legislation, the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236 (Jan. 2, 1974), is an example
of the willingness of the federal government to invest in bankrupt railroads in the
national interest. In addition to establishing procedural steps to effectuate the purpose
of restructuring the rail system in the Northeast and Midwest regions, the Act
authorizes the issuance of up to $1.5 billion in federally guaranteed loans to finance
the purchase of rolling stock, and $500 million in direct federal payments.
Earlier legislation indicative of strong federal support for bankrupt railroads
includes the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-146 (Nov. 3, 1973),
and the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
35. 474 F.2d at 837.
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would adequately protect the rights of creditors.
While utilization of escrowed funds to finance improvements can
be justified by the public interest rationale, it is submitted that a stricter
feasibility of reorganization standard should apply to these forced loans,
making the risk taken by the creditor closer to that which an investor
might freely accept. Forcing investment in a railroad "when it is too
early to make confident predictions one way or the other"8 6 as to whether
it will survive, may give too much weight to the public interest to the
37
detriment of secured creditors.
M. S. B.

CIVIL RIGHTS

SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PENSION PLAN VIOLATES
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.

Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (3d Cir. 1973)
Two male employees of the Public Service Electric and Gas Company' brought suit against their employer 2 alleging that the company's
4
3
original noncontributory pension plan and its subsequent modification
36. 332 F. Supp. at 1305.
37. Of course the danger is that a standard which is too lenient may approach
establishing a public right rather than merely recognition of a public interest. See
Note, Takings and the Public Interest in Railroad Reorganization, 82 YALE L.J. 1004,
1017 (1973).
1. Both were active employees of the company when suit was commenced and,
as such, had standing to sue. The court did not view the subsequent acceptance
of retirement benefits by one of them as a forfeiture of standiog. Rosen v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1973). Utility Co-Workers
Association, the certified bargaining representative for 1,800 of the 15,000 company
employees, was also a party-plaintiff. The court refrained, however, from deciding
whose rights the union had standing to assert. Id. See generally LABOR-MANAGEMENT
SERVICES

ADMINISTRATION,

RETIREES

(1973).

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,

UNION

STATUS

& BENEFITS OF

2. Plaintiff-employees had perfected their right to proceed in the district court
by complying with the procedural requirements of The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 259 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1972). Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775,
782 n. 2 4 (3d Cir. 1969).
3. The company's original pension plan, in force from 1911 to 1967, permitted
retirement at different ages and after different periods of service for men and women.
Male employees could retire with full pension benefits at age 65 after 25 years of
service, and were forced to retire at age 70. Males were eligible for early retirement
between the ages of 60 and 65 upon completion of 30 years' service but suffered a
reduction in their benefits. Female employees became eligible for full pension benefits
at age 60 with 20 years' service and mandatory retirement age was 65. 409 F.2d at
777 n.6.
4. The revised pension plan, although it eliminated the disparity in age and
length of service, favored female employees by eliminating provisions for the reduction of their retirement benefits due to service with the company prior to the effective
date of the modification. Thus, under both the original and modified plans, a male
employee electing early retirement at age 60, after 30 years' service, would receive
a lower annual pension payment than a female retiring at the same age with the same
Published bylength
Villanova
Charles Widger
School
of Law Digital
1973 v. Public Serv.
of University
service, assuming
the same
average
annualRepository,
salary. Rosen
Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 461 (D.N.J. 1971).
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violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 5 (the Act)'by discriminating
against them on the basis of sex in the determination of benefits. Following reversal of its summary judgment in favor of the company, 6 the district court, on remand, found the pension plans in violation of the Act.7
All parties appealed and the Third Circuit affirmed,8 holding that section
703 (a) (1) of the Act 9 prohibited sex discrimination in the determination
of pension benefits and that to the extent that the plans in question differentiated between individuals solely on the basis of sex they violated the Act.
Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).

While Title VII 10 has been found applicable to many areas of
employer-employee relations," only recently have litigants invoked the
Act to challenge the legality of fringe benefit programs.' 2 Whether
pension plans are properly within the sex discrimination prohibition of
Title VII presented a question of first impression for the Third Circuit.
In answering that question, the court gave initial consideraaion to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 3 interpretation of the
Act which construed section 703(a) (1) as including pension plans with5. Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as
amended (Supp. II, 1972). The Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
6. References to the district court's oral opinion are found in Rosen v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1969).
7. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.J. 1971).
8. While affirming the district court's finding that the plans were violative of
the Act, the court remanded for a determination of damages. 477 F.2d at 96.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
10. A partial legislative history of Title VII can be found in 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2355 (1964).
11. The provisions of Title VII have been found to be controlling in areas of
hiring, Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971); job assignment,
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970) ; promotion,
Le Blanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd
on other grounds, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972) ; job classification, Bowe v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); and wage differentials, Glus v. G.C.
Murphy Co., 329 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa. 1971). See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R.
Fed. 15 (1972).
12. Fringe benefits include, but are not limited to: medical, hospital, accident,
and life insurance; retirement benefits; profit sharing and bonus plans; and leave.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex § 1604.9(a), 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972).
The instant case aside, the only reported case to date which has dealt with a commonly denominated fringe benefit of the employment relationship is Bartmess v.
Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971),
which was cited approvingly by the Third Circuit in Rosen. Bartmess held that
retirement plans are "conditions of employment" within the meaning of Title VII.
Id. at 1189.
13. Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705(a)-(d),
(f)-(j), 78 Stat. 258, 259 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. II, 1972)
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC), the
administrative agency responsible for the Act's enforcement, and delineated its powers.
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in its ambit.14 While EEOC Guidelines do not have the force of law, 15
the court was convinced that the EEOC's interpretation furthered the
Act's legislative purpose and was consistent with the plain meaning of
the language employed. 16 The fact that language in the Labor-Management Relations Act, 17 similar to that found in section 703(a)(1) of the
Act, had been held to include retirement benefits' 8 further persuaded the
court that discriminatory pension plans contravene Title VIi.
Following the 1972 publication of revised EEOC Guidelines dealing
with employment discrimination on the basis of sex, which gave specific
attention to fringe benefits, 19 there had been speculation as to how fringe
benefit plans would be affected by judicial construction of Title VII.20
The decision in the instant case and that of the Seventh Circuit in Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc.,2 1 which similarly held retirement plans
containing different treatment for men and women to be violative of Title
VlI,22 indicate that further speculation regarding the legality of discriminatory pension plans is unwarranted, and suggest the type of reception
which the courts can be expected to give other discriminatory fringe
benefit programs.
F. P.N.
14. The EEOC Guidelines provide in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a
pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory
retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates on the basis of sex.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex § 1604.9(4), 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972).
15. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). However, the Supreme Court has said that the administrative interpretation of Title VII by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
16. 477 F.2d at 95.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
18. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949). The court in Inland Steel held that pension plans are included
within the phrase "other conditions of employment," and rejected the argument that
since retirement plans were not specifically mentioned in the labor legislation they
were not a condition of employment. Id. at 249-50. The court referred to a variety of
topics which the language discussed could readily cover. Id. at 253.
19. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex § 1604.9, 37 Fed. Reg. 6837
(1972).
20. Haneberg, The EEOC and Employee Benefit Plans, 111 TRUSTS & ESTATES
726 (1972).
21. 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
22. Id. at 1189. The Bartmess court cited with approval the district court de,cision in the instant case. Id.
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United States v. Malinowski (3d Cir. 1973)
Defendant Malinowski, a member of the Philadelphia War Tax
Resistance League,' was convicted in the United States District' Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of violating section 7205 of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) 2 for willfully supplying false information on an Employee Withholding Exemption Certificate (Form W-4). s
The defendant had submitted a Form W-4 to his employer in which he
claimed 15 exemptions when he knew that under Internal Revenue criteria
he was entitled to only two.4 Attached to the form was a letter from
Malinowski in which he noted his opposition to the use of his tax money
for "war-making" purposes.5
The defendant requested jury instructions to the effect that he could
not be found guilty of willfully making a false statement within the
meaning of section 7205 because he had not acted with an evil or bad
purpose. 6 The district court rejected Malinowski's argument, defining
the proper standard for willfullness to be that the act had been committed
"voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to do that
1. United States v. Malinowski, 347 F. Supp. 347, 351 (E.D. Pa. 1972). This
organization opposed the payment and use of federal income taxes for support of the
war in Indochina. See Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 41a, 43a.
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7205, provides in pertinent part:
Any individual required to supply information to his employer under section 3402
who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information . . . shall . . . upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than 1
year, or both.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 3402 requires the withholding of taxes from wages.
Id. § 3402.
3. 347 F. Supp. at 351.
4. Id. at 350 n.2. The parties had stipulated that: (1) thirteen of the 15 exemptions claimed were not permitted exemptions; (2) appellant knew this at the time he
submitted his Form W-4 to his employer; and (3) appellant knew that he was an
individual who had to supply such information to his employer by reason of section
3402. United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 853 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 970 (1973). See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 152.
5. 472 F.2d at 852. The letter stated in part:
Please note the sharp increase in exemptions on my W-4 tax form. I have entered
into a relationship of economic and social dependency with a group of 15 persons.
One of our aims is to exercise greater control over the use of our taxes, especially
that large portion that is used for war-making. I will notify the Internal Revenue
Service of this change in my status ....
Id. The employer notified the Internal Revenue Service and was instructed that all
withholdings had to be made on the basis of the information furnished on the Form
W-4 submitted by Malinowski. Brief for Appellant at 5.
6. 472 F.2d at 853. Defendant specifically requested jury instructions which
provided that:
In the criminal law, an act is wilfull if it is done with a bad purpose, without
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
justifiable excuse, and without a ground for believing that the act was lawful.
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whi:h the law forbids,"'7 and entered judgment on the guilty verdict
returned by the jury.8 On appeal, the defendant contended that the district court had improperly interpreted the willfullness element of section
7205, and argued, alternatively, that his conduct constituted activity protected by the first amendment.9 The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that
the act could be found to have been done willfully within the meaning of
section 7205 if done voluntarily and with the specific intent to do something forbidden by the law, even if it was not done with a bad or evil
purpose. The court further held that the defendant's conduct did not
fall within the first amendment's protection of symbolic speech. United
States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970
(1973).
While prior to Malinowski the term "willfully" had not been construed in the context of section 7205,10 it had been interpreted in prosecutions under other penal sections of the Code, including section 7203,
the provisions of which are analogous to those of section 7205.11 In
United States v. Murdock, 12 the Supreme Court held that bad faith or
evil intent was an element of a willful failure to supply information to
the Internal Revenue Service, as proscribed by the predecessor of section
7203.13 The Murdock Court found that the petitioner's good faith belief
that adherence to the letter of the Code would have threatened his right
against self-incrimination could have negated the existence of the requisite
willfullness, despite the fact that he had acted intentionally and without
4
legal justification.'
The Court again discussed the meaning of willfully, as used in the
predecessor of section 7203, in Spies v. United States,15 wherein it held
that two misdemeanors - willful failure to file a return and willfull
failure to pay tax - taken together did not constitute the felony of willfull
attempt to evade or defeat a tax.16 In reaching this decision, the Spies
Court noted, in dicta, that the willfullness element of tax crimes was
susceptible to varying interpretations and that its meaning was often
influenced by the context in which it was used. 17 While stating that
7. 347 F. Supp. at 353.

8. Id. at 351. Defendant's motions for a new trial and judgment of acquittal
were denied by the district court.
9. 472 F.2d at 853.
10. See Brief for Appellant at 9; Brief for Appellee at 5.
11. Section 7203 is a tax misdemeanor statute, as is section 7205, which provides
for a fine and/or imprisonment for the willfull failure to pay tax, file a return, keep
records, or furnish required information. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7203 (emphasis added).
Both the appellant and the appellee in this case relied upon section 7203 cases
in their briefs as the principal source of precedent from which the proper meaning of
the term "willfull" in a section 7205 context could be established. See Brief for
Appellant at 9; Brief for Appellee at 5, 6.
12. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
13. Id. at 394-95
14. Id. at 396-98.
15. 317 U.S. 492 (1942).
Published by Villanova
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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17. Id.
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"[m]ere voluntary and purposeful, as distinguished from accidental,
omission to make a timely return might meet the test of willfullness,"' 8
the Court further noted that it would expect willfullness in the context of
nonpayment of a tax to include some component of "evil motive and want
of justification."' 9
Considerable confusion resulted in the circuit courts over the proper
interpretation of these two Supreme Court opinions, and hence, over the
proper construction of the term "willfully" in section 7203.20 The Third
Circuit's position has been that the "existence of a specific intent - an
evil motive - at the time the crime charged was committed" 21 is required
for conviction under section 7203 ;22 while other circuits, relying on dicta
from Spies, have held that, although bad purpose is required for conviction of a tax felony, something less is required for conviction of a tax
23
misdemeanor.
In addressing this troublesome question of interpretation, the Malinowski court initially examined those prior Third Circuit decisions which
the defendant contended supported his position that proof of evil or bad
purpose is a requisite element of willfullness. The court read the earlier
decision in United States v. MartellJ2 4 as holding that an instruction concerning willfullness in a tax evasion case which included the phrase "bad
purpose" was confusing and gave the jury "the impression that one could
be convicted for income tax evasion through inadvertent error," and,
therefore, was erroneous.2 5 The Malinowski court noted that willfullness,
as defined by the Martell court, required only awareness by the taxpayer
of the existence of an obligation in conjunction with a wrongful intent
to conceal that tax obligation, and concluded that the jury charge in the
26
instant case complied with that suggested in Martell.
18. Id. at 497-98.
19. Id. at 498.
20. See Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1958), which held
that something less than bad purpose is required for a misdemeanor, basing its decision
on Spies dicta. But see Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1963),
which specifically disapproved of the Abdul decision. See generally Orlando, Use of
Inconsistent Standards of "Willfullness" Under Section 7203 Creates Confusion,
37 J. TAx 214 (1972).
21. United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872, 882 (3d Cir. 1958).
22. Id. This position was emphatically reaffirmed in United States v. Vitiello,
363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966).
23. See, e.g., Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958).
24. 199 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 917 (1953).
25. 472 F.2d at 854, citing 199 F.2d 670. The Malinowski court did not elaborate
upon the situation presented in Martell, however, the specific context in which that
decision was made should be noted. In Martell, the trial court had instructed the jury
that, while no willfullness was required for conviction in a tax case, the Government
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, with bad purpose attempted
to evade his tax. 199 F.2d at 671. The Third Circuit held that these instructions
were confusing to the jury and that willfullness was an essential element of the tax
crime involved. Id. It was thus the use of the phrase "bad purpose" in the presence
of a charge which excluded any requirement of willfullness that the Martell court
had found to be confusing. The court in Martell did not address the issue of the
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
necessity or propriety of a charge regarding "bad purpose" in other contexts.
26. 472 F.2d at 853-54, citing 199 F.2d 670.
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. Reviewing the other cases cited by defendant, 27 the court concluded
that the phrase "bad purpose" had been interjected into the concept of
willfullness in order to distinguish deliberate acts from acts of negligence
or mistake, and to differentiate situations involving bona fide misconceptions about the requirements of a statute from those is which theconduct had been attended by knowledge of a legal obligation and a purpose to prevent the Government from receiving that which was lawfully
required by the statute. 28 The Malinowski court concluded that the cases
did not support the defendant's position because the intent-negligence
dichotomy with which they dealt was not relevant in the instant situation,
and because none of them had ever considered bad purpose to be an
element of the offense separate and distinct from the specific intent to,
do something which law forbids.2 9 The court expressly acquiesced in
the district court's comment that " 'bad purpose' and 'evil purpose' are not
'magic words' which must be included in a jury charge on willfullness. ' 31 0
In addressing defendant's contention that his good faith motive for
violating the statute was a valid defense for his deliberate and intentional
conduct, the court noted that this same argument, raised in the context
of Vietnam War protest, had been rejected by the First and Fourth
Circuits.3 1 The court also drew a comparison between the case before
it and the situation presented in Crowe v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue" wherein the Eighth Circuit had taken the position that a taxpayer could not be allowed to "evade payment of his legal tax obligations
on the basis of his dissatisfaction with the distribution of revenue." 3 3
Consideration of these cases led the Malinowski court to conclude that
motive was not relevant to the issue of whether or not the defendant
had violated the statute, and that the trial court had been correct in stating
27. Those cases presented by defendant as supportive of his position included:
251 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958) ; United States v.

United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Cirillo,
Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957).

28. 472 F.2d at 854-55.
29. Id. at 855.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 855-56, citing United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (lst Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
In Boardman, the defendant, a conscientious objector, failed to report for
civilian work in compliance with a selective service order, basing his action on his
belief in the immorality and illegality of the Government's conduct in relation to the
war. The First Circuit, defining the requisite mental element for conviction to be an
awareness of legal obligation and a deliberate purpose not to comply, held that such
claims did not preclude a criminal conviction. 419 F.2d at 114. See United States v.
Rabb, 394 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1968).
In Moylan, a draft record burning case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the "statutory requirement of willfullness is satisfied if the accused acted intentionally, with knowledge that he was breaching the statute." 417 F.2d at 1004.
32. 396 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1968).
33. Id. at 767. The defendant in Crowe had argued that the Government did not
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in its charge to the jury that defendant's motives could not be an accept34
able defense.
Defendant had further argued that his first amendment right of
symbolic protest negated the existence of the essential element of willfullness.3 5 He analogized his position to that of the defendant in Murdock,
wherein the Court had found a possible negation of the requisite willfullness in the defendant's good faith belief that strict compliance with the
Code would have threatened his constitutional right against self-incrimi-nation.8 6 The Malinowski court distinguished Murdock, noting that
"'[t]he crux of Murdock [was] not that the taxpayer was pointing to a
provision in the Constitution that allegedly protected his conduct, but
that he acted under a reasonable misapprehension of his obligation" un-der the Code.3 7 As Malinowski had had no such misapprehension, the
,court rejected his first amendment argument, denominating it to be a
restatement in constitutional terms of his "good faith" defense which
'had been rejected.3 8
The court's construction of willfully in section 7205, as denoting an
.act done voluntarily, intentionally, and with specific intent to do that
which the law forbids, obviously facilitated resolution of the issues pre:sented by the defendant's "good faith" and first amendment defenses.
If that element of the offense requires only that the defendant have intended to do that which he did, then the reason why he did so - his
34. 472 F.2d at 856. Defendant had further argued that willfuilness could be

megated by proof that he had acted with a reasonable belief in the legality of his
conduct. He pointed to Principles II, IV, and VII of the Nuremberg Charter, which
provide that compliance with internal law or with the order of one's government does
not relieve an individual from responsibility under international law where the conduct in question constitutes "[c]omplicity in the commission of a crime against ...
humanity ...." Id. at 856 n.7. The Malinowski court did not consider the defense
applicable here, noting defendant's "remoteness" from and "utter lack of direct involvement" in the conduct he claimed to be wrong. Id.
35. Id. at 857. See Brief for Appellant at 16-20.
36. 472 F.2d at 857. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
37. 472 F.2d at 857. The court noted, as another distinction between the two
cases, that "Murdock was beset by the tax processes; whereas Malinowski deliberately
,engaged the tax processes as well as the criminal machinery." Id. See Brief for
Appellee at 12.
38. 472 F.2d at 857. The court found support in United States v. Moylan, 417
F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970), wherein the Fourth
,Circuit noted that to "encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to
which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos." 472 F.2d at 858 n.9, quoting 417 F.2d at 1009.
Defendant had raised several other arguments, all of which were rejected
by the court. The first was that, since his employer and the Internal Revenue Service
'knew that the exemptions were not genuine but rather mere symbolic speech, they
could not be considered false or fraudulent under section 7205. The court noted,
however, that the expressed object of the action was to diminish his taxpaying obligations and thus the funds available for Government prosecution of the war. Id. at
'858-59. The defendant further argued that reputation testimony should have been
admitted at the trial. The court dismissed this contention as there was no controversy concerning the operative facts and the relevance of such testimony would therefore be questionable at best. Id. at 859-60. Defendant's last contention was that he
had been a victim of selective prosecutorial discrimination. The court could find no
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
abuse of discretion in the lower court's finding that defendant had failed to sustain
ihis burden of proof in this matter. Id. at 860.
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motive is, as the Malinowski court noted, irrelevant.39 The court
determined that the phrase "bad purpose," employed by a number of
courts in section 7203 cases, was "occasionally pertinent language" rather
than "black letter law."' 40 Apparently the Malinowski court regarded the
"bad purpose" language of those cases as referring to the purpose or
intent to do something forbidden by the statute. It is submitted, however, that bad purpose connotes something more than mere intent and
that the court improperly construed willfully by refusing to include "bad
41
purpose" in its definition.
The added requirement of bad purpose would have been significant
in light of the defendant's "good faith" argument. The thrust of that
defense was the defendant's reasonable belief in the legality of his actions,
which was based on his conviction that the Nuremberg Charter Principles
mandated that he be subject to prosecution under international law if he
did not withdraw his support from the war effort in Vietnam, negated
the element of willfullness. 4 2 A definition of willfullness which included
the phrase "bad purpose" would have allowed the defendant to argue
that he was subject to two different laws, only one of which could be complied with in the same action, and that noncompliance with one could not
be said to have been with bad purpose since he had acted in compliance
with the other. However, since the court found that defendant's motives
were not relevant or an acceptable legal defense to a violation of section
7205, the court was able to dispose summarily of defendant's Nuremberg
defense as being inapplicable. 43 The court specifically noted that it did
44
not consider or decide the validity of such a defense in another context.
However, it might be suggested that the court, in refusing to require the
existence of bad purpose for a violation of section 7205, sought to avoid
recognizing a viable utilization of the Nuremberg defense which might then
be urged in subsequent actions.
By defining willfullness as it did, the court sought to avoid the possibility of the jury confusing "belief in a good cause although acting
illegality" with "belief that one is acting lawfully." It should be noted
that the defendant's suggested jury charge offered the court an alternative
definition of willfull which would arguably have avoided that problem
while also including bad purpose as a requirement. The charge included
within its definition of willfull that the act be committed "without a
ground for believing that the act was lawful. ' 45 Such a restriction, if
read strictly, would have limited the "bad purpose" ingredient. It would
appear that had the defendant's requested charge been used, a jury could

39. 472 F.2d at 856.
40. Id. at 854 n.4.
41. Id. at 855.
42. Id. at 856 n.7.
43. Id.University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
Published by Villanova
44. Id.
45. Id. at 853.
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have found him guilty on the grounds that he had no reasonable basis for
believing that his action was lawful.
The future application of the Malinowski decision may be limited
in light of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Bishop.4 6 The Bishop Court held specifically that the tax offenses set forth
in sections 720647 and 720748 require the same "bad purpose" standard of
willfullness, and found the same to be true of the other offenses set forth
in sections 7201-7205 inclusive. 49 The Court concluded that:
Until Congress speaks otherwise, we therefore shall continue to require, in both tax felonies and tax misdemeanors that must be done
'willfully,' the bad purpose or evil motive described in Murdock .... 50
However, it should be noted that the Court, prior to reaching that conclusion, also stated that "the word 'willfully' generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."5 1
While it is possible to distinguish Bishop on the grounds that it was
a pure tax fraud case, and while Bishop does contain some apparently
contradictory language, it would appear that much of the broad language
of that decision does detract from the Malinowski opinion. It is significant, however, that the Third Circuit in United States v. Braun,52
considered Bishop and its own decision in Malinowski in affirming a
conviction under section 7205 in a situation which was factually identical
to that in the instant case. 53 Apparently the Third Circuit regards the
requirement of a specific intent to do that which the law forbids as comporting with the "bad purpose" requirement specified in Murdock, and
reaffirmed in Bishop, and will continue to apply the Malinowski standard,
at least in cases where the underlying presence of a volatile issue, such
as legality of the Vietnam War, might increase the confusion potentially
created by use of the phrase "bad purpose." The Malinowski decision
not only points out but increases the semantic confusion surrounding the
proper definition of willfully - a confusion which may be alleviated if
46. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
47. This section provides in pertinent part that:
Any person who . . . [w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement or

other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is
made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true
and correct as to every material matter . . . shall be guilty of a felony ....
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7206.

48. Section 7207 is a misdemeanor statute which states that:

Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary or his delegates
any list, return, account, statement, or other document, known by him to be

fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter, shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7207.
49. 93 S. Ct. at 359-61.
50. Id. at 361. See Bender, Supreme Court's Bishop Decision: A Useful Clarification of "Wilfull" in the Fraud Area, 39 J. TAX 188 (1973).
51. 93 S. Ct. at 360.
52. 485 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973).
53. Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 7, United States v. Braun, 485
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/7
F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973).
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legislation now pending in Congress, which would eliminate the phrase
"willfully" in sections 7201-7207 of the Code, is adopted. 5 4
54. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1401-02 (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 1401-02 (1973). The two bills would make the standard of culpability for
the offenses of disregarding a tax obligation or falsely claiming an exemption "knowingly." Knowingly is defined as:
A person acts knowingly . . . with respect to his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct. A person acts knowingly . . . with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware or believes that circumstances
exist, or is aware of a high probability of their existence, or intentionally avoids
knowledge as to their existence. A person acts knowingly . . . with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware or believes that his conduct is substantially
certain to cause the result.
S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b) (1973); H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §
.302(b) (1973).

V.J.K.
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